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NO-HIRE PROVISIONS IN MCDONALD'S FRANCHISE
AGREEMENTS, AN ANTITRUST VIOLATION OR EVIDENCE OF
JOINT EMPLOYER?
BY ANDRELE BRUTUS ST. VAL*
I. INTRODUCTION

In the past few years, there has been a wave of national attention and
public campaigns on protecting workers' rights.' The overall premise of
these movements is that companies are profiting off the backs of workers
while providing them with wages that are insufficient to allow them to feed
their families, pay their bills, or have a decent standard of living. Recent
economic studies have weighed in on the debate, and they suggest that wage
stagnation and inequality may be attributable to labor market collusion, and
specifically, no-hire agreements.2
Economists and scholars alike assert that large firms with market power
are dominating the labor market by restricting workers' employment choices
through restrictive covenants.3 It had been assumed that such covenants,
including covenants not to compete or solicit, were typically only present for
highly-skilled workers who were able to appropriately assess the cost-benefit
of signing such agreements and who would be properly compensated for
foregoing their rights. However, recent litigation has shown that restrictive
*. Assistant Professor of Legal Writing at the University of Pittsburgh School of Law. Sincere thanks to
Sanjukta Paul, Brenda Freeman, Gretchen Myers, Henry St. Val, and Sarah Corbett.
1. See, e.g., Rachel Abrams, Why Aren 't Paychecks Growing? BurgerJoint Clause Offers a Clue,
N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 27, 2017), <https://www.nytimes.com/2017/09/27/business/pay-growth-fast-foodhiring.html>; Alan B. Krueger & Eric Posner, Corporate America Is Suppressing Wages for Many
Workers, N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 28. 2018), <https://www.nytimes.com/2018/02/28/opinion/corporateamerica-suppressing-wages.html>. Also, organizations like the National Employment Law Project
(NELP) and "Fight for $15" have launched a public campaign to urge policymakers to increase the
<
RAISE
THE
MINIMUM
WAGE,
$15
an
hour.
See
minimum
wage
to
https://raisetheminimumwage.com/fight-for-I 5/> (last visited Feb. 12, 2020).
2.

ALAN B. KRUEGER & ERIC A. POSNER, THE HAMILTON PROJECT, A PROPOSAL FOR

PROTECTING Low-INCOME WORKERS FROM MONOPSONY AND COLLUSION 8-9 (2018),
<https://www.hamiltonproject.org/assets/files/protectingjlowincome-workers-frommonopsony-coll
usion krueger-posner-pp.pdf>.
3. "As firms have grown in size, they have become capable of dominating local labor markets - a
phenomenon referred to as monopsonization - and of using their market power to suppress wages. There
is also evidence that some firms have colluded, entering into no-poaching and similar arrangements that
restrict workers' choices among employers." Id. at 4.
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covenants are also being used to limit employment opportunities for lowwage, low-skilled workers. A recent study found that over half of major
franchises include a no-poach clause in their franchise agreements, including
those in the healthcare, automotive, and fast food industries.4 This practice
is particularly prevalent in the fast food franchising industry, which is the
largest employer out of all of the various franchising sectors and will be the
5
focus of this article.
In entering into franchise agreements with franchisees, franchisors have
included provisions that bar a franchisee (both franchisee and franchisoroperated units) from hiring another franchisee's employee. These specific
forms of non-compete agreements are termed no-poach or no-hire
agreements.6 Economists have found these clauses have a detrimental effect
on low-wage employees in the franchising industry. As will be discussed in
section II, these provisions do not arise in the same context as typical
employee non-compete agreements for highly-skilled workers, although the
effects are similar-the employees' choices in employment are restricted.
While fast food employees account for the majority of the workers in the
franchising industry, they earn next to the lowest of all the occupations in the
U.S. labor force.7 Besides the low wages, these workers are subject to low
8
workplace standards, often in violation of labor and employment laws.
In late 2017, in what appears to be a concerted plan to challenge the
status quo and advocate for better working conditions and employment
protections, workers began to challenge no-hire clauses in franchise
agreements as violating section 1 of the Sherman Act.9 Class action lawsuits
4. See Allen B. Krueger & Orley Ashenfelter, Theory and Evidence on Employer Collusion in the
Franchise Sector 24 tbl. lb (Nat'l Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 24831, 2018)
<https://www.nber.org/papers/w24831 .pdf>.
5. Fast food establishments employed over 3.5 million workers (both full and part-time) in 2017,
followed by a little over I million in the Table/Full-Service Restaurants sector, and 636,050 in the
Business Services establishment. IHS MARKIT ECONOMICS, FRANCHISE EDUC. & RESEARCH FOUND.,
FRANCHISE BUSINESS ECONOMIC OUTLOOK FOR 2018, JANUARY FORECAST 19 (2018).
6. No-poach and no-hire agreements are substantially identical; any difference comes from the
labeling used by the drafter of the provision. Legally, there is no difference between the two. Both
restrictions prohibit the agreeing parties from hiring one another's employees, regardless of whether the
employee voluntarily seeks alternate employment or if the employee is approached or poached. As such,
the titles will be used here interchangeably.
7. Andrew Elmore, FranchiseRegulation for the FissuredEconomy, 86 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 907,
910 n.7 (2018) ("Fast food employees earn an average hourly minimum wage of $9.73 per hour, which
the U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics recorded as the lowest average wage of all U.S. occupations except
for gaming dealers," citing May 2017 National OccupationalEmployment and Wage Estimates: United

States, U.S. BUREAU LABOR STATISTICS (Mar. 30, 2018), <https://www.bls.gov/oes/2017/may/
oesnat.htm #00-0000> [<https://perma.cc/XVY5-6HWK>]).
8. Id. at 910; see also, Nadra Nittle, Fast-Food Workers Are Always in the Line of Fire, EATER
(Apr. 25, 2019), <https://www.eater.com/2019/4/25/18516104/fast-food-workers-salary-job-stability-

benefits>.
9.

15 U.S.C. § 1 (2012).
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were filed against McDonald's,"° Pizza Hut,1" and Jimmy John's. 2 The
arguments raised in all three complaints were very similar, if not identical.
The plaintiffs were all employees of their respective franchises who were
unable to secure subsequent employment within the same franchise because
of a no-hire provision in the franchise agreement. The plaintiffs challenged
the no-hire clauses under federal and state antitrust statutes.
As described below, employers have defended the use of these
restrictive covenants in the workplace as a method for protecting their
investments into their most valued asset: their employees. They maintain that
these provisions ensure that they receive a return on the time, money, and
effort they invest in employees. In defending antitrust lawsuits, franchisors
have raised similar arguments to no-poach and no-hire agreements. They
argue that they are allowed to engage in employee coordination through the
use of such agreements since they are in a single enterprise or are part of an
intra-brand franchise system with their franchisees. However, this position
is contrary to the position franchisors have taken in labor cases concerning
joint-employer liability. In those cases, franchisors instead contend that they
have no control over their franchisees' employment practices and play no
role in the hiring or firing in their franchisees' restaurants.
Viewing these conflicting positions through one lens, this article argues
that franchisors are using franchise agreements to set forth and control
franchisee employment practices - indeed, in the antitrust case they are
advocating that they have the absolute right to do so - while disavowing any
liability as joint-employers for labor and employment violations. By taking
these conflicting positions, franchisors, and especially those in the fast food
industry, can reap the benefits of exercising control while avoiding the
liability that results when their franchisees comply with the parameters they
set forth. This conflict, while most evident in the franchising context, has
implications in the broader discourse for labor reform and worker
protections. For example, if, as employers like McDonald's contend,
franchisors are in an intra-brand or firm enterprise with their franchisees,
then why are franchise employees unable to bargain collectively across
franchise locations?13 While salient, this question will be set aside and
10. On June 28, 2017, a complaint was filed against McDonald's by Leinani DesLandes in the
Northern District of Illinois. DesLandes v. McDonalds, No. 17-cv-04857 (N.D. Ill. filed June 28, 2017).
11. On November 3, 2017, Kristen Ion commenced an action against Pizza Hut in the U.S. District
Court Eastern District of Texas. Ion v. Pizza Hut, LLC, No. 17-cv-00788 (E.D. Tex. dismissed without
prejudice July 16, 2018).
12. Sylas Butler filed his complaint against Jimmy John's on January 24, 2018. Class Action
2018) (No. 18-cv-00133).
Complaint, Butler v. Jimmy John's Franchise LLC, 331 F. Supp. 786 (S.D. Il.
13. The National Labor Relations Board has a presumption in favor of single-plant or single-store
units. See Friendly Ice Cream Corp. v. NLRB, 705 F.2d 570, 576 (1st Cir. 1983) ("When considering the

282

EMPLOYEE RIGHTS AND EMPLOYMENT POLICY JOURNAL

[Vol. 23:2

developed in future scholarship.
While the courts have yet to decide whether no-hire provisions in fast
food franchise agreements violate antitrust laws, this article posits that nohire provisions are evidence of franchisors' control over franchise employee
hiring, which along with other evidence from the franchise agreement and
relationship supports a finding that franchisors are joint employers with their
franchisees. Franchisors should not be allowed to reap the benefits of
exercising control over their franchisees and the workers at their franchise
locations while avoiding liability as joint employers for the results of such
control in labor disputes. Because no one, not even fast food giants in the
franchising industry, should have their cake (or fries) and eat it, too.
In section II, I will provide a framework for understanding the antitrust
issues in fast food franchising. I will summarize fast food franchising,
antitrust law, and no-poach/no-hire agreements. With this framework in
mind, I will then discuss in section III pending antitrust lawsuits, specifically
highlighting the suit against McDonald's corporation, the archetypical
franchisor and industry leader, and using it as an antitrust case study. I will
explore the parties' respective positions as to the legality of no-hire
provisions and cursorily review the district court's ruling on McDonald's
motion to dismiss. I will also note some of the other federal lawsuits that
have been filed challenging no-poach provisions in franchise agreements in
other franchising sectors. In section IV, I will present a framework for
understanding the National Labor Relations Act's (NLRA) jointemployment standard and its complicated history, as interpreted by the
National Labor Relations Board (NLRB or the Board). Then, in section V, I
will present the varying viewpoints as to franchisors' joint-employer
liability, using McDonald's lawsuits as a case study. With this foundation
laid, in section VI, I will explain how franchisors' position in the antitrust
cases conflict with their positions in the labor cases, as highlighted by an
analysis of the McDonald's cases. Finally, I will conclude by proposing a
solution to the conflict and suggesting how courts could frame and analyze
appropriateness of a single store bargaining unit in a multistore retail operation, the Board is aided by its
policy that a single store is presumptively an appropriate unit for bargaining.") (citations omitted); Alaska
Statebank v. NLRB, 653 F.2d 1285, 1287 (9th Cir. 1981) ("[Tlhe Board has adopted, in the retail sales,
industrial, insurance, and banking industries, a presumption that a single store, plant, office or branch is
an appropriate unit. This presumption has generally received approval by the courts."); David Madland,
How to Promote Sectoral Bargainingin the United States, CTR. FOR AM. PROGRESS ACTION FUND (July
10, 2019, 12:01 AM), <https://www. americanprogressaction.org/issues/economy/reports/ 2019/07/10/
174385/promote-sectoral-bargaining-united-states/> ("The current U.S. labor system is designed to
fragment bargaining into small units, typically of workers at individual worksites. U.S. labor law allows
for broader-based bargaining, such as with multiple employers, but makes this type of bargaining difficult
to achieve.") (citations omitted). But if, as franchisors argue, the franchise is a single entity, then this
would assist in overcoming the Board's presumption.
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the issue.
II. FRAMEWORK FOR UNDERSTANDING THE ANTITRUST ISSUE IN
FRANCHISE AGREEMENTS

A. The Sherman Act
Section 1 of the Sherman Act declares "[e]very contract, combination

in the form of trust or otherwise, or conspiracy, in restraint of trade or
commerce among the several States, or with foreign nations... to be
illegal." While there are several debates over the purpose of the Act,' 4 the
current and accepted view is set forth below.
The Sherman Act was designed to be a comprehensive charter of
economic liberty aimed at preserving free and unfettered competition as
the rule of trade. It rests on the premise that the unrestrained interaction of
competitive forces will yield the best allocation of our economic
resources, the lowest prices, the highest quality and the greatest material
progress, while at the same time providing an environment conductive
to
15
the preservation of our democratic political and social institutions.
In the landmark case Standard Oil Co. of New Jersey v. United States,
the Supreme Court pronounced that section 1 bars contracts that
unreasonably restrain trade.' 6 In assessing reasonableness, a provision is
classified as either horizontal or vertical. Then, depending on the
classification, it is analyzed either under the per se rule or the rule of reason.
A horizontal agreement is an agreement among those at the same
functional level, i.e., competitors, to gain anticompetitive results.' 7 A classic
14. See Charles S. Dameron, Present at Antitrust's Creation: Consumer Welfare in the Sherman
Act's State Statutory Forerunners, 125 YALE L.J. 1072, 1077 (2016) (proposing that the purpose of the
Sherman Act - consumer welfare - "can be found outside the immediate legislative history of
the Sherman Act, in a body of pre-Sherman Act state law"); Harry S. Gerla, Restoring Rivalry as a
Central Concept in Antitrust Law, 75 NEB. L. REv. 209, 211 (1996) ("It is time to restore rivalry to the
throne and reestablish it as a central concept in antitrust law. Defining competition in terms of rivalry is
both sound law and sound economics."); Robert H. Lande, A Traditionaland Textualist Analysis of the
Goals of Antitrust: Efficiency, Preventing Theft from Consumers, and Consumer Choice, 81 FORDHAM
L. REv. 2349, 2351 (2013) (asserting "that the overriding purpose of the antitrust statutes is to prevent
firms from stealing from consumers by charging them supracompetitive prices" and that
"[e]conomic efficiency was only a secondary concern"); Sanjukta M. Paul, The Enduring Ambiguities of
Antitrust Liabilityfor Worker Collective Action, 47 LOY. U. CHi. L.J. 969, 990 (2016) ("The first federal
antitrust statute, the Sherman Act, was not originally intended to apply to worker collective action, and
was instead aimed at protecting traditional small American enterprise from the massive business
conglomerations that arose over the course of the nineteenth century.").
15. N. Pac. Ry Co. v. United States, 356 U.S. 1, 4 (1958).
16. 221 U.S. 1,59-60(1911).
17. N Pac Ry Co,356 U.S. at 5; see also Copperweld Corp v Indep. Tube Corp., 467 U.S. 752, 768
(1984) ("Section 1 of the Sherman Act, in contrast, reaches unreasonable restraints of trade effected by a
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example is price fixing.' 8 Horizontal restraints are generally held to be per
se illegal under the Sherman Act. 19 The per se prohibition applies to restraints
that "have manifestly anticompetitive effects and lack ... any redeeming
virtue. 2 ° Such agreements are conclusively presumed to be unreasonable
with no inquiry into the reason for their use or the harm caused. The rationale
for the prohibition is that the restrictions will lead to a decrease in output and
limit competition. The Supreme Court has determined that the practice is so
inherently destructive that it has no other purpose but to eliminate
21
competition.
When the restraint is not among competitors but instead those in the
same industry at different functional levels, it is a vertical agreement. Typical
examples include a parent company and a subsidiary, a buyer and a seller, or
a retailer and a manufacturer.22 The per se rule does not apply to "restraints
imposed in the context of business relationships where the economic impact
of certain practices is not immediately obvious."23 Rather, such restraints are
analyzed under the rule of reason. 2 1 "Under this rule, the factfmder weighs
all of the circumstances of a case in deciding whether a restrictive practice
should be prohibited as imposing an unreasonable restraint on
competition., 25 The court undertakes a detailed analysis of the agreement,
any harm it may cause, and any justifications or legitimate objectives it may
achieve. 26 "[T]he facts peculiar to the business, the history of the restraint,
and the reasons why it was imposed" may also be analyzed to determine a
'contract, combination ... or conspiracy' between separate entities.").
18.
19.

Texaco Inc. v. Dagher, 547 U.S. 1, 5 (2006).
Arizona v. Maricopa Cty. Med. Soc'y, 457 U.S. 332, 345 (1982) (quoting United States v.

Socony-Vacuum Oil Co., 310 U.S. 150, 218 (1940)) ("[P]rice-fixing agreements are unlawful per
se under the Sherman Act and ...

no showing of so-called competitive abuses or evils which those

agreements were designed to eliminate or alleviate may be interposed as a defense.").
20.

Leegin Creative Leather Prod., Inc. v. PSKS, Inc., 551 U.S. 877, 886 (2007) (citation and

quotation marks omitted).
21.

The Court, however, has not always taken this position. See e.g., Appalachian Coals v. United

States, 288 U.S. 344, 360-61 (1933) ("The mere fact that the parties to an agreement eliminate
competition between themselves is not enough to condemn it. The legality of an agreement or regulation
cannot be determined by so simple a test, as whether it restrains competition.") (citation and quotation
omitted), overruled by Copperweld Corp., 467 U.S. at 777 (1984).
22. E.g., Bus. Elecs. Corp. v. Sharp Elecs. Corp., 485 U.S. 717, 730 (1988) (explaining that

"agreement between firms at different levels of distribution [are] vertical restraints"); Cont'l T.V., Inc. v.
GTE Sylvania Inc., 433 U.S. 36 (1977).
23. F.T.C. v. Ind. Fed'n of Dentists, 476 U.S. 447, 458-59 (1986).
24. Leegin, 551 U.S. at 885-86.

25. Id. at 885 (quoting Cont'l T.V., Inc., 433 U.S. at 49).
26. State Oil Co. v. Khan, 522 U.S. 3, 10 (1997) ("As a consequence, most antitrust claims are
analyzed under a "rule of reason," according to which the finder of fact must decide whether the
questioned practice imposes an unreasonable restraint on competition, taking into account a variety of
factors, including specific information about the relevant business, its condition before and after
the restraint was imposed, and the restraint's history, nature, and effect.").
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27
vertical agreement's competitive effects.
However, under the rule of reason, the court will forego the detailed
market analysis above and use the shortened "quick-look" analysis when "an
observer with even a rudimentary understanding of economics could
conclude that the arrangements in question would have an anticompetitive
effect on customers and markets."2 8 Once the anticompetitive effects of the
restraint are identified, the burden then shifts to a defendant to "show
' 9
empirical evidence of procompetitive effects."

B. The FranchisingModel
The franchise relationship is one in which a lead firm grants the right to
operate a business under the franchise brand. In exchange for that right, the
other person (or business entity) must pay fees and/or royalties and agree to
operate the business in substantial compliance with the franchisor's
operating guidelines. According to some social scientists, franchising is a
method of "fissuring,"3 whereby a corporate entity increases its wealth by
taking what it deems to be nonessential functions outside of the firm and
retaining only core properties within the firm. This reduces the firm's
expenses and limits its exposure to liability. In the fast food industry,
fissuring occurs through franchising."
In business format franchising, which is the leading franchising format
in the fast food industry,32 the franchisor contracts with other business
ventures or individuals to operate restaurants using the franchise name and
business model and process. The franchise agreement encapsulates the terms
and conditions for operating the franchise restaurant. Typical provisions
include a grant of franchise, advertising, training, and quality control.3 3 A

27. Nat'l Soc. of Prof I Eng'rs v. United States, 435 U.S. 679, 692 (1978).
28. Cal. Dental Ass'n v. F.T.C., 526 U.S. 756, 770 (1999) (reviewing the history of cases applying
the "quick-look" analysis.).
29. Id.at776n.12.
30. See generally DAVID WELL, THE FISSURED WORKPLACE: WHY WORK BECAME SO BAD FOR SO
MANY AND WHAT CAN BE DONE TO IMPROVE IT (2014). Other methods include subcontracting and

outsourcing.
3 1. See Brian Callaci, Vertical Dis-Integration and the Creation of a New Business Form:
Franchising1960-1980 (Univ. of Mass.-Amherst, Dep't of Econ. Working Paper, 2018) (providing an
institutional and historical examination of franchising through the studying of the "concrete struggles
franchisors undertook to establish their unique business form").
32. Elmore, supra note 7, at 913.
33. See 16 C.F.R. § 436.3 (2019); Rick Grossman, The 19 Covenants of a Standard Franchise
Agreement, ENTREPRENEUR (Jan. 13, 2017), <https://www.entrepreneur.com/article/286680>;
AllBusiness
Editors,
Ten Key Provisions of Franchise Agreements, ALL Bus.,
<https://www.allbusiness.com/-key-provisions-of-franchise-agreements-2193-1 .html> (last visited Feb.
16, 2020).
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no-hire clause, also known as "no-poaching" or "no-switching" clause, 34 in
which the franchisee agrees not to hire the employees of another franchisee
within the same franchise brand, is also common in a franchise agreement.
Once a provision is incorporated into the franchise agreement, it is contained
in all of the franchisor's franchise agreements. 35 Franchise agreements tend
to be standard, and generally the same core provisions are used with all
franchisees so as to promote equitable treatment and uniformity. It binds all
the franchisees since they must abide by its terms or risk being ousted from
the brand, and it affects their employees.
However, the terms of a franchise agreement are typically unknown to
the employees. They will only learn of a no-hire restriction, if at all, when
they attempt to obtain another position with a different franchise within the
franchise brand. This type of restriction reduces employment choices and
forces employees to choose one of two options. They can remain at the
current location or they can leave the franchise family altogether and start all
over with another franchise brand or in another industry.
While overall little is known about the use of such covenants in the
workplace and of their effects on the labor market, a study of the largest
national franchisors (those with over 500 franchises) conducted by
economists Allen B. Krueger and Orley Ashenfelter found that "58 percent
of major franchise chains include 'noncompetitive [(or no-hire)] clauses' in
their franchise contract that restrict the recruitment and hiring of workers
currently employed (and in some cases extending for a period after
employment) by other units affiliated with the franchisor."3' 6 Of particular
relevance, the study found that 80 percent of restaurants in the quick-service
or fast-food industry contained such restrictions. 37 Although the economists
acknowledge that data on a no-hire agreement's impact on workers' pay and
mobility within a franchise is unavailable, they ultimately concluded that the
agreements may limit workers' job opportunities and might explain why
wage growth has stagnated.

38

Employment opportunities are adversely affected by the no-hire
34. See David K. Haase & Darren M. Mungerson, Agreements Between Employers Not to Hire
Each Other's Employees: When Are they Enforceable?, 21 LAB. LAW. 277 (2006) (explaining the
different analysis courts use to scrutinize no-poach agreements); see also, Krueger & Ashenfelter, supra

note 4, at 24 tbl. lb (noting that 80 percent of restaurants in the quick-service or fast-food industry contain
no-hire or no-poach clauses).
35. Michael Seid, Franchise Agreement vs. Franchise Disclosure Document, THE BALANCE
SMALL Bus. (Apr. 13, 2019), <https://www.thebalancesmb.com/franchise-agreement-vs-franchisedisclosure-document-I 350607>.

36.
37.

Krueger & Ashenfelter, supra note 4, at 4.
Id. at 24 tbl. lb.

38.

Id. at 21-22; see also Krueger & Posner, supra note 2.
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agreements in part due to the effect on employees' bargaining power.3 9 They
remove the employees' ability to leverage the training received at one
franchise location to advocate for better pay at another.4" The sources of
employees' power stems from the training in the franchisor's unique
policies, procedures, and proprietary technology, which are standard
throughout the franchise. Employees can leverage that power against the
prospective employer in the same franchise brand to ask for better wages,
since training costs would be minimal, or none, at a new location. With
retraining a non-issue, employees are in a stronger competitive position to
negotiate their pay rate with the new franchisee. And the current franchisee,
faced with the possibility of losing the investment it has in trained employees
and of having to spend more money to train replacements, would be
motivated to increase employees' pay.4 1 However, because of the no-hire
agreement signed and assented to by all franchisees, employees cannot
leverage their training, and mobility within the franchise is severely
restricted.
By removing the option of gaining alternate employment within the
same franchise, no-hire agreements substantially weaken the employees'
power within the labor market. The employees are not only unable to use the
training to gain better pay within the franchise brand, but the franchisorspecific training provides no additional procompetitive benefit with another
franchisor in the fast food industry, since the employees will need to be
retrained on a new franchisor's unique system.42 This allows franchisees to
continue to offer their workers a lower base wage because those employees
cannot work for another franchise that would offer higher pay based on their
prior experience. Thus, similar to the effects of noncompete agreements,43
39. "Bargaining power is defined as the ability to influence negotiations to gain a larger share of
the benefits of the bargain. A party's bargaining power is determined by his or her alternatives and the
party's ability to resist agreement relative to the other party to the agreement." KENNETH G. DAUSCHMIDT ET AL., LEGAL PROTECTION FOR THE INDIVIDUAL EMPLOYEE 357 (5th ed. 2016).

40. See Krueger & Ashenfelter, supra at note 4, at 17 ("[R]estricting workers' outside options will
shift the share of the net returns from training in the direction of employers.").
41. See e.g., Eric Rosenbaum, PaneraIs Losing Nearly 1000% of Its Workers Every Year as FastFood Turnover Crisis Worsens, CNBC (Aug. 29, 2019), <https://www.cnbc.com/2019/08/29/fast-foodrestaurants-in-america-are-losing-100percent-of-workers-every-year.html> (noting that a 2013 survey
"put the cost of fast-food turnover at $1,600 per worker, and that was at a time when turnover was
significantly lower. The turnover cost estimates have kept going up. The cost per employee now is
estimated by the National Restaurant Association at $2,000 per employee").
42. Meaning, an employee who works at McDonald's will not gain any additional benefits over
employees in the labor market by taking his or her training at McDonald's and working at Burger King.
Each franchisor in the franchising sector has its own unique and uniform system, in which each employee
must be trained.
43. See OFFICE OF ECON. POLICY, U.S. DEP'T OF THE TREASURY, NON-COMPETE CONTRACTS:
ECONOMIC EFFECTS AND POLICY IMPLICATIONS 3-4 (2016), <https://www.treasury.gov/resource(indicating
that by
center/economic-policy/Documents/UST%20Non-competes%20Report.pdfl>
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which are entered into directly by the employer with the employee, 4 no-hire
agreements diminish employees' bargaining power and employment
mobility, which then leads to suppressed wages. 45 However, unlike with
noncompete agreements, the employees are not a party to the franchising
contract that contains the no-hire agreement.
C. No-Poach/No-HireAgreements
In its simplest form, a no-poaching covenant is an agreement, either
in writing or orally, between two or more companies not to compete
for each other's employees, such as by not soliciting them during
for a period of time after the
their employment or not hiring them
46
termination of their employment.
A no-poach agreement is a subset of non-compete agreements. Other
subcategories include no-recruiting, no-solicitation, and no-hire.47 As
indicated by their names, each provision restricts the contracting party from
reducing worker's bargaining power, non-compete agreements can also lower employee wages); see also
Alan B. Krueger, The Rigged Labor Market, MILKEN INST. REV. (April 28, 2017),
<http://www.milkenreview.org/articles/the-rigged-labor-market>; Evan Starr et al., Noncompetes in the
U.S. Labor Force (Univ. of Mich. L. & Econ. Research Paper No. 18-013, Sept. 12, 2019),
<https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract id=2625714> (examining "the use, implementation,
and effects of noncompete agreements").
44. See Norman D. Bishara et al., An EmpiricalAnalysis of Noncompetition Clauses and Other
Restrictive Postemployment Covenants, 68 VAND.L. REV. 1, 2 (2015); John Dwight Ingram, Covenants
Not to Compete, 36 AKRON L. REV. 36, 49 (2003); Orly Lobel, Why Noncompetes May Give You the
Least Desirable Employees, WALL ST. J. BLOG (Jan. 22, 2014), <http://blogs.wsj.com/accelerators/
2014/01/22/orly-lobel-why-non-competes-may-give-you-the-least-desirabe-employees/>; see also On
Amir & Orly Lobel, Driving Performance: A Growth Theory on Noncompete Law, 16 STAN. TECH. L.
REV. 833, 837 (2013) (suggesting "a new view of the costs and benefits of postemployment restrictions").
A restrictive covenant is frequently included in an employment contract to govern the employee's conduct
on the termination of the employment relationship. Such covenants are intended to prevent employees
from competitively using information or contacts acquired through the employment governed by the
contract. Richard E. Kaye, Cause ofAction to Enforce Noncompetition Covenant in Employment, in 36
CAUSES OF ACTION 2d 103 (2008); see also Michelle L. Evans, Enforceability of Covenant Not to
Compete, 104 AM. JUR. PROOF OF FACTS 3d 393 (2008) ("When a new employee and/or consultant is
hired by a company, the company will generally require that the new employee and/or consultant sign an
agreement containing a covenant not to compete. The covenant will typically prevent the employee and/or
consultant from creating or working for or with a competitor company within a certain geographic area
and within a certain time period after termination of the relationship with the company.").
45. See OFFICE OF ECON. POLICY, supra note 43, at 20-21 (explaining that "[a]s workers progress
through their careers, switching jobs is more difficult in states that stringently enforce non-competes.
Given that job switching is generally associated with substantial wage increases, this increased difficulty
of switching would reduce wage growth over time").
46. Lawrence J. Del Rossi, Part 22 of "The Restricting Covenant" Series: No-Poaching
Agreements, NAT'L L. REV. (Apr. 11,2019), <https://www.natlawreview.com/article/part-22-restrictingcovenant-series-no-poaching-agreements>.
47. Id.; see also Michael Lindsay et al., Employers Beware: The DOJand FTCConfirm that Naked
Wage-Fixingand "No-Poaching"Agreements Are PerSe Antitrust Violations, ANTITRUST SOURCE, Dec.
2016, at I n.2 ("No-poaching agreements are also called no-hire, no-interference, non-solicitation, or noswitching agreements, depending on the circumstances.").
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a specific action. However, unlike other types of restrictive covenants in the
employment context,4 8 when the aforementioned restrictions are found in
franchise agreements, they place limitations not only on the franchisees but
also on franchise employees without their knowledge. These covenants are
not between franchisee and franchisee or franchisee and employees but are
solely between each individual franchisee and the franchisor.4 9 Yet, implicit
in the no-poach agreement is a promise between all the franchisees that they
will abide by the restriction and that the franchise employees are bound by
them." All franchisees 5 within the franchise are aware of their required
compliance with the provision and of their ability to compel adherence by
another franchisee. Although this article primarily focuses on no-hire
provisions, since that is the named provision in the various franchise
litigation suits challenging such terms, the general arguments apply equally
to no-poach agreements as well.
D. Policy Reactions to No-Hire Clauses
Because of the negative effects that no-hire agreements have on wages
and the economy, in October of 2016 the Department of Justice (DOJ)

48. Covenants not to compete in a business setting, as opposed to the sale of a business, concerning
employment are generally entered into by the employer and the employee with the employee's full
knowledge and consent and are typically limited in time, space, and location. See Jean Murray, What Is
a Restrictive Covenant in Business Law?, THE BALANCE SMALL BUS. (Feb. 12, 2019),
<https://www.thebalancesmb.com/what-is-a-restrictive-covenant-in-business-law-398201 >.
49. Graphically, the relationship will look like the following:

FFRANCH ISOR

50.
As will be seen below, most of the no-hire provisions in fast food franchise litigations do not
distinguish managers from rank-and-file workers. They generally apply equally to every member of the
franchise workforce. As such, unless specifically indicated otherwise, any mention of employees applies
to all workers in the franchise restaurant.
51. Because no-poach agreements apply to all franchises, regardless if they are franchiseeowned or franchisor-operated, I will not differentiate between the two, and the use of "franchisee" applies
to both unless otherwise indicated.
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Antitrust Division and the Federal Trade Commission (FTC) jointly issued
an Antitrust Guidancefor Human Resource Professionals(2016 Guidance),
announcing their intention to "criminally investigate allegations that
employers have agreed among themselves on employee compensation or not
to solicit or hire each other's employees. '5 2 They explained that like pricefixing and market allocation, which have been prosecuted as "hardcore cartel
eliminate
irredeemably
agreements
no-poach/no-hire
conduct,
53
competition." The DOJ and FTC's position is that these agreements are per
se illegal under antitrust law, and specifically section 1 of the Sherman Act.
The Joint 2016 Guidance further provided that "if the agreement is
separate from or not reasonably necessary to a larger legitimate collaboration
between the employers, the agreement is deemed illegal without any inquiry
into its competitive effects." 54 Appearing to clarify this point in the 2016
Guidance, on March 7, 2019, the DOJ filed a Statement of Interest in three
then-pending lawsuits that alleged antitrust violations based on no-poach
agreements in the fast food franchising sector.55 Plaintiffs were former
employees who sued their former employers-three fast food franchisors
Carl's Jr, Auntie Anne's, and Arby's-and their franchisees, alleging that
the defendants conspired to keep the costs of wages down by restricting
competition in the labor market so they could increase their profits.5 6 In what
appears to be a retraction of its prior position, the DOJ stated that most nopoach/no-hire agreements are subject to the rule of reason. 7 This appears to
contradict the 2016 Guidance, in which the DOJ propounded that in the
8
It
franchising context, no-poach agreements are per se illegal.
differentiated between naked no-poach restrictions that warrant per se
treatment and typical no-hire agreements, advocating that standard no-hire
agreements are vertical agreements "because the franchisor and the
franchisee normally conduct business at different levels of the market
structure."5 9 The DOJ warned, however, that "[b]ecause franchisees are not
52. DEP'T OF JUSTICE ANTITRUST DIVISION & FED. TRADE COMM'N, ANTITRUST GUIDANCE
GUIDANCE],
2016
[hereinafter
4
(2016)
PROFESSIONALS
RESOURCE
HUMAN
FOR
<https://www.justice.gov/atr/file/9035 11/download>.

53. Id.
54. Id.at 3.
55. Corrected Statement of Interest of the United States of America, Stigar v. Dough Dough
Inc., No. 2:18-cv-00244 (E.D. Wash. dismissed Apr. 18, 2019).
56. Complaint at 7, Stigar,No. 2:18-cv-00244); First Amended Complaint at 7, Richmond v.
Bergey Pullman Inc., No. 2:15-cv-00246 (E.D. Wash. dismissed Apr. 18,2019); Complaint at 6-7, Harris
v. CJ Star, LLC, No. 2:15-cv-00247 (E.D. Wash. dismissed Apr. 23, 2019).

57. Corrected Statement of Interest at11,Stigar, No. 2:18-cv-00244.
58. See 2016 GUIDANCE, supra note 52, at 3 ("Naked wage-fixing or no-poaching agreements
among employers, whether entered into directly or through a third-party intermediary, are per se illegal

under the antitrust laws.").
59. Corrected Statement of Interest at 11, Stigar, No. 2:18-cv-00244.
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usually corporate divisions or wholly owned subsidiaries of their franchisors,
a court must not presume that they should be treated as a single entity under
Copperweld.' ' 60 The DOJ clarified that "Copperweld and American Needle
are the relevant authority in considering whether a franchisee and franchisor
should be treated as a single entity under the antitrust laws." 61 It noted that if
there exists "direct competition between a franchisor and its franchisees to
hire employees with similar skills, a no-poach agreement between them is
correctly characterized as horizontal and, if not ancillary to any legitimate
and procompetitive joint venture, would be per se unlawful. ' 62 It asserted
that courts "should evaluate how the alleged business relationship operates
63
in practice with respect to the entities' economic interests."
On November 21, 2017, Senators Cory Booker of New Jersey and
Elizabeth Warren of Massachusetts submitted a joint letter to then-United
States Attorney General Jeff Sessions expressing their concerns about the
no-poaching, or no-hiring, practice.' In the letter, Senators Booker and
Warren noted how the "collusion between franchisee corporations and their
subunits... may be suppressing workers' wages and job mobility."6 5 While
applauding the DOJ's 2016 Guidance on no-poach agreements, they
requested that Attorney General Sessions answer several questions so they
could better understand the DOJ's efforts to combat the proliferation of such
provisions in franchise agreements. 66 It does not appear that Mr. Sessions
ever answered the senators' questions.
On March 1, 2018, the two senators introduced the End Employer
Collusion Act. 67 An identical bill was introduced in the House of
Representatives by Representative Keith Ellison from Minnesota. 68 The bills
are aimed at ending no-hire agreements and would allow civil suits for actual
and punitive damages. They also would give the FTC the power to enforce
69
the bill. The bill was not enacted.
60. Id.
61. Id. at 7.
62. Id. at 13.
63. Id. at 7.
64. See Letter from Elizabeth Warren, U.S. Senator, and Corey Booker, U.S. Senator, to
Jeff Sessions, Attorney Gen. of the U.S. (Nov. 21, 2018), <https://www.scribd.com/document/
365092277/2017-11-2 l-Letter-to-Sessions-on-No-Poach-Agreements>.
65. Id. at 1.
66. Id. at 2-3.
67. S. 2480, 115th Cong. (2018), <https://www.congress.gov/bill/I 15th-congress/senatebil/2480>.
Act,
H.R.
5632,
115th
Cong.
(2018),
68. End
Employer
Collusion
<https://www.congress.gov/bill/l 15th-congress/house-bill/5632>.
69.See H.R. 5632 (115th): End Employer Collusion Act, GovTrack, <https://www.govtrack.
us/congress/bills/1 15/hr5632> (last visited Feb. 16, 2020). In 2015, a slightly similar bill, the Mobility
and Opportunity for Vulnerable Employees Act (MOVE Act), S. 1504, 114th Cong. (2015),
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Following the lead of the DOJ, FTC, and Senators Booker and Warren,
ten states looked into laws to end no-hire clauses.70 The attorneys general of
these states asked leading fast food franchisors for information and
documents relating to no-hire provisions in their franchise agreements.71
Thus, it is evident that with direct competitors in the same industry,
like McDonald's and Burger King, 72 no-poach and no-hire agreements
violate antitrust law. 73 However, the question is whether no-hire agreements
within a franchise are different. Courts have yet to rule on the validity of noof this
hire agreements in fast food franchising agreements. As of the date
74
article, the lawsuits are either pending or have settled out of court.
HI. ANTITRUST CASE STUDY: DESLANDES V. MCDONALD'S

With the basic antitrust framework in mind, we can look to Deslandes

<https://www.congress.gov/bill/l14th-congress/senate-billU1504/actions> was introduced under the
labor-friendly administration of President Obama. The MOVE Act sought to prohibit employers from
entering into noncompete agreements with low wage workers. Nonetheless, the Act stalled in the Senate
and failed.
70. The ten states involved are California, Massachusetts, New York, Illinois, Maryland,
Minnesota, New Jersey, Oregon, Pennsylvania, and Rhode Island. The District of Columbia also joined
in the letter. Rachel Abrams, "No Poach" Deals for Fast-Food Workers Face Scrutiny by States, N.Y.
TIMES (July 9,2018), <https://www.nytimes.com/2018/07/09/business/no-poach-fast-food-wages.html>;
see also Melissa Hellmann, Washington AG's Deal Grants Mobility to Fast Food Workers Nationwide,
SEATTLE WEEKLY (July 13, 2018), <http://www.seattleweekly.com/news/washington-ags-deal-grantsmobility-to-fast-food-workers-nationwide/>.
71. Letter from Cynthia Mark, Chief, Fair Labor Division, Mass. Office of the Attorney Gen.
et al., to redacted parties, Request for Information Regarding Franchise Agreements (2018),
<https://ag.ny.gov/sites/default/files/npnh-letter-redacted.pdf>.
72. A classic example of this is the DOJ's investigation of antitrust violations in the
technology industry. See, e.g., United States v. eBay, Inc., 968 F. Supp. 2d 1030, 1034 (N.D. Cal. 2013)
("Plaintiffs filed the instant actions against eBay, alleging that eBay entered into a no-solicitation/no-hire
agreement with Intuit in violation of Section 1 of the Sherman Act."); United States v. Lucasfilm, Inc.,
No. CIV.A. 10-02220 RBW, 2011 WL 2636850, at *1 (D.D.C. June 3, 2011) ("The alleged
anticompetitive agreement had three components: '(1) that [Lucasfilm and Pixar (the firms) ] not cold
call each other's employees; (2) that the firms notify each other when making an offer to an employee of
the other firm; and (3) that the firm making the offer to the other firm's employee not counteroffer above
its original offer.' Compl. 16. The United States claims this is a per se violation of Section One of the
Sherman Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1 (2006), because it eliminated significant forms of competition to attract
digital animators and, overall, substantially diminished competition to the detriment of affected
employees who likely were deprived of competitively important information and access to better job
opportunities."); United States v. Adobe Sys., Inc., No. 10 CV 1629, 2011 WL 10883994, at *2 (D.D.C.
Mar. 18, 2011) (involving Adobe, Apple, Google, Intel, Intuit, and Pixar).
73. Leegin Creative Leather Prods., Inc. v. PSKS, Inc., 551 U.S. 877, 886 (2007) ("Restraints
that are per se unlawful include horizontal agreements among competitors to fix prices, or to divide
markets.") (citations omitted).
74. "On March 18, plaintiffs in the Eastern District of Washington, potentially seeing the
writing on the wall, quickly settled their suits less than two weeks after the DOJ Statement." Nicole L.
Castle & Matt Evola, INSIGHT. DOJ Distinguishes 'No-Poach' Franchise Agreements, BLOOMBERG
LAW (Mar. 21, 20 19), <https://news.bloomberglaw.com/mergers-and-antitrust/insight-doj-distinguishesno-poach-franchise-agreements>.
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v. McDonald's, which provides an illustration of the antitrust-labor law
conflict in franchising. While the focus on this case study will be the suit
against McDonald's by Leinani Deslandes, it will also briefly discuss other
suits brought against franchisors Pizza Hut and Jimmy John's. An analysis
of Deslandes, and particularly McDonald's arguments as to why its no-hire
clause does not violate antitrust law, is critical in understanding how its
antitrust position conflicts with its position in the joint-employer cases.
McDonald's Corporation is considered the prototypical franchisor in
the fast-food industry. McDonald's USA, LLC, is a wholly-owned
subsidiary of McDonald's Corporation, and together, the two serve as
franchisors of thousands of McDonald's franchises.75 McDonald's 76 has the
highest share of the fast food market. In 2015, it had a 17 percent share of
the market, with Yum! Brands, the owner of Taco Bell, KFC, Pizza Hut, and
more, at second place with 10.8 percent.77 In 2019, it was found to have the
highest name brand value of any fast-food brand.78 McDonald's success is
due largely to its franchising model.79 Over 90 percent of its restaurants are
franchisee owned and operated." All of its franchise agreements contain nohire provisions. Arguing in support of its no-hire provisions, McDonald's
has maintained that as a corporation that operates in an intrabrand-franchise
system with its franchisees,81 it is allowed to engage in coordination through
75. See
McDonald's
Corp.,
BLOOMBERG,
<https://www.bloomberg.com/profile/
company/MCD:US> (last visited Feb. 16, 2020); McDonald's USA, LLC, BLOOMBERG, <https://
www.bloomberg.com/research/stocks/private/snapshot.asp?privcapld 9069926> (last visited Feb. 16,
2020).
76. Hereinafter, any reference to McDonald's is to both McDonald's USA, LLC and

McDonald's Corporation as franchisor and not to any individual restaurant or franchisee, unless otherwise
indicated.
STATISTA,

77. Market Share of Leading Brands in the United States Fast Food Industry in 2015,
(Apr. 26, 2017) <https://www.statista.com/statistics/1966 11/market-share-of-fast-food-

restaurant-corporations-in-the-us/>.
78. Brand Value of the 10 Most Valuable Fast Food Brands Worldwide in 2019 (in Million
U.S. Dollars), STATISTA <https://www.statista.com/statistics/273057/value-of-the-most-valuable-fast-

food-brands-worldwide/> (last visited Feb. 16, 2020).
79. See How McDonald's Became the Leader in the Fast Food Industry, PROFITWORKS,

<https://profitworks.ca/blog/541-how-mcdonalds-became-the-leader-fast-food-industry-marketingstrategy> (last visited Feb. 16, 2020); Chase Purdy, McDonald's Isn't Just a Fast-Food Chain - It's a
Brilliant $30 Billion Real-Estate Company, QUARTZ (Apr. 25, 2017), <https://qz.com
965779/mcdonalds-isnt-really-a-fast-food-chain-its-a-brilliant-30-billion-real-estate-company/> (noting

that "[t]he company keeps about 82% of the revenue generated by franchisees, compared with only about
16% of the revenue from its company-operated locations").
80. Franchising Overview,

MCDONALD'S

<https://corporate.mcdonalds.com/corpmcd/

franchising/overview.html> (last visited Feb. 16, 2020).
81. In Continental T.V., Inc. v. GTE Sylvania Inc., 433 U.S. 36, 52 n.19 (1977), the Supreme
Court defined intrabrand competition as "the competition between the distributors wholesale or retail of
the product of a particular manufacturer." This argument appears to be akin to the" 'now-defimct doctrine
known as the "' intraenterprise conspiracy doctrine,' [that] once treated cooperation between legally
separate entities as necessarily covered by § 1." Am. Needle, Inc. v. Nat'l Football League, 560 U.S. 183,
192 (2010).
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82
the use of no-hire clauses in its franchise agreements.

A. Deslandes v. McDonald's

1. Facts and Procedural History
Deslandes, like the other plaintiffs who have challenged the use of nohire provisions in franchise agreements, is a former employee of a
franchisee-owned McDonald's who claimed that she was prevented from
gaining subsequent employment with a franchisor-operated McDonald's
because of the no-hire provisions in the company's franchise agreement. The
McDonald's no-hire clause at issue, as found in the complaint and in the
franchise agreement attached to the complaint, was as follows:
Interference With Employment Relations of Others. During the

term of this Franchise, Franchisee shall not employ or seek to
employ any person who is at the time employed by McDonald's,
any of its subsidiaries, or by any person who is at the time
operating a McDonald's restaurant or otherwise induce, directly
or indirectly, such person to leave such employment. This
paragraph [] shall not be violated if such person has left the
the foregoing parties for a period in excess of
employ of any of
83
six (6) months.

Although the employees are affected by the no-hire clause, the franchise
agreement does not contain a notice provision under which either the
franchisor or the franchisee would inform the employee of the restrictions.
At all times during employment, the employee is typically unaware of the
agreement entered between the franchisor and the franchisee, despite its dire
effect on his or her employment options.
Deslandes began her employment with the McDonald's franchisee
location at the entry level and worked her way up to department manager,
hoping to become a general manager.84 She maintained that she applied to
attend a week-long training program that would entitle her to become eligible
for the general manager position but that her supervisors canceled her
attendance upon learning she was pregnant.85 She also alleged that the
franchisee failed to pay her for overtime hours worked.86 She contended that

82. See infra text accompanying note 104.
83. Amended Class Action Complaint at 22, Deslandes v. McDonalds, No. 17-cv-04857 (N.D.
Ill. filed Sept. 18, 2017).

84. Id. at 15-16.
85. Id. at 16.
86. Id.
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because of the working conditions, overtime violations, and adverse action
based on her pregnancy, she sought employment at a corporate location
nearby. She wanted better pay and improvement in the quality of her work
environment.87
Deslandes was not even interviewed for the position.88 She asserted that
despite her qualifications, she was denied the opportunity solely due to the
no-hire provision. She stated that she was informed that as a current
McDonald's employee, she could not be hired, let alone interviewed, for the
position.89 The franchisee with whom she was employed would have had to
sign a release for her to become eligible for consideration. According to
Deslandes, the franchisee refused to sign the release because she was too
valuable an employee.9 ° Deslandes remained at the franchisee location until
she could no longer work there.9 1 She argued that the job refusal at the
corporate location denied her the opportunity for better pay and job growth.
92
She subsequently took a lower-paying job at a Hobby Lobby.
The crux of Deslandes's complaint was that McDonald's colluded with
its franchisees, including franchisor-operated franchises, to suppress
employee wages by contracting to not hire or solicit each other's
employees. 93 She claimed that because employees earn below a living wage
and their skills are valuable only to other McDonald's restaurants, the nohire clause minimizes employees' bargaining power within the McDonald's
94
franchise and restricts employee mobility and competition for workers.
Deslandes's federal antitrust argument 9 centered on the per se
unlawfulness of horizontal agreements. She asserted that the franchise
agreement and the franchise disclosure document specifically provide that
franchisees (regardless of ownership) are competitors and that the franchise
agreement precludes the franchisee from being an agent of the corporation,
87. Id.
at16-17.
88. Id. at 17.
89. Id.
90. Id. at17-18.
91. Id.at18, 28.
92. Id.at18; Clint Rainey, The Fast-food Industry Took a Step Toward Making Workers'
Lives Slightly Less Miserable, GRUB STREET (July 16, 2018), <http://www.grubstreet.com/2018/07/fastfood-chains-no-poach-clauses-legally-binding.html>.
93. Amended Class Action Complaint at 3, Deslandes,No. 17-cv-04857.
94. Id.at 5.
95. Deslandes also alleged violation of state statutes, which are of little relevance to the issue
addressed in this article and will not be discussed. In Count 1I of the amended complaint, Deslandes
claimed that McDonald's, in violation of the Illinois Antitrust Act, 740 ILCS 10/1, et seq., "engaged in
predatory and anticompetitive behavior to not solicit restaurant-based employees and/or managers from
other McDonald's restaurants." Id. at 33. In Count Ill, she alleged that McDonald's "actions to restrain
trade and fix the total compensation of the Class Members constitutes unfair competition and unlawful,
unfair, and fraudulent business acts and practices in violation of the Illinois Consumer Fraud and
Deceptive Business Practices Act, 815 1LCS 505/1, etseq." Id. at 36.
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identifying them instead as independent contractors.9 6 She also asserted that
McDonald's no-hire clause does not serve the interests of the corporation,
the restaurants, the employees, or the customers but instead restricts
competition, suppresses wages, and restrains trade. 9" According to
Deslandes, employment with a competitor outside of the franchise is not a
reasonable employment substitute because the skills and knowledge she
attained all related to McDonald's proprietary systems, applications, and
procedures that are nontransferable to other brands in the industry.98
Deslandes alleged that even though the franchise agreement containing
the no-hire clause was organized and policed by McDonald's, the no-hire
clause itself operates between fast food restaurants at the same distribution
level.99 As such, it is a horizontal restraint that is not subject to the rule of
reason. She asserted that when employers agree to reduce competition for
are engaging in price fixing, to which the per se rule of
employees, they 100
illegality applies.
Defendant McDonald's Corporation answered the complaint, denying
Deslandes's allegations, and moved to dismiss the action."0 ' At the core of
the parties' argument over whether the court should summarily dismiss the
action was whether the no-hire clause was a horizontal or vertical restraint.
While McDonald's argued that the no-hire clause is a vertical 0restraint,
2
Deslandes maintained that the provision is a horizontal restriction.
McDonald's argued that Deslandes failed to state a Sherman Act claim
under either the per se rule or the rule of reason. More specifically, it argued
that Deslandes failed to allege the existence of a horizontal agreement to
suppress wages or failed to establish that the per se prohibition applies to
restraints in the franchise context.10 3 It asserted that because franchise
agreements are between a franchisor and franchisee-not between direct
competitors-they are vertical agreements to which per se liability cannot
attach." 4 It contended that such vertical restraints are subject to the rule of

96. Id. at 19.
97. Id. at 36-37.
98. Id. at 27.
99. Id. at 24-25.
100. See id. at 6.
101. Answer, Deslandes v. McDonalds, No. 17-cv-04857 (N.D. Ill. Aug. 28, 2017); Answer
to Plaintiff's Amended Complaint, Deslandes v. McDonalds, No. 17-cv-04857 (N.D. I11.Aug. 27, 2018);
Defendant's Memorandum in Support of their Motion to Dismiss Plaintiffs First Amended Complaint,
Deslandes v. McDonalds, No. 17-cv-04857 (N.D. 111.Oct. 2, 2017).
102. Deslandes v. McDonalds, No. 17-cv-04857, 2018 WL 3105955, at *6 (N.D. Ill. June
25, 2018).

103. Defendant's Memorandum in Support of their Motion to Dismiss Plaintiffs First
Amended Complaint at 8-11, Deslandes, No. 17-cv-04857.
104. Id. at 11.
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reason, the elements of which plaintiff also failed to plead.' °5 It therefore
requested that the court dismiss the complaint with prejudice.
In addition to arguing that the no-hire clause is a vertical restraint,
McDonald's also asserted that it was in an intrabrand franchise system with
its franchisees, which, according to it, "fosters coordination and reduces
competition within the McDonald's system."' 16 This is a critical assertion by
McDonald's. As discussed below, this assertion directly conflicts with the
position it has taken in joint-employer cases. This admission lends itself to a
finding that McDonald's exercises control over franchise employees.
Deslandes, quoting language from McDonald's brief in a separate case
before the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals, Salazar v. McDonald's
Corporation,'0 7 countered that McDonald's has denied that it engages in any
labor and employment coordination with its franchisees.' 0 8 She argued that
because McDonald's does not manage the franchisee's employment
practices and specifically disavowed that it does, it therefore follows that
McDonald's is not engaged in an intrabrand system with the franchisees that
agreements as an allowable method of
would justify the use of no-hire
09
coordination.
employment
McDonald's asserted that its position in Salazar was irrelevant to the
underlying proceedings since the underlying action does not involve a joint
employer. 110 McDonald's fails to acknowledge that its intrabrand argument
contradicts the position it took in Salazar - that it was not a joint employer
because it plays no role in the franchisee's ability to make employment
decisions. By asserting that it can lawfully place no-hire provisions in the
franchise agreements, it is arguably conceding that it controls an aspect of
its franchisees' hiring decisions.
2. Court's Ruling
The District Court, Judge Jorge L. Alonso presiding, denied
105. Id. at 15-19.
106. Defendant's Reply in Support of their Motion to Dismiss Plaintiff's First Amended
Complaint at 1, Deslandes v. McDonalds, No. 17-cv-04857 (N.D. Ill. filed Dec. 11, 2017).
107. 944 F.3d 1024 (9th Cir. 2019) (considering whether McDonald's was a joint employer
of franchisee's employees for purposes of the California Labor Code).
108. Plaintiffs Sur-Reply in Opposition to Defendants' Motion to Dismiss at 2, Deslandes v.
McDonalds, No. 17-cv-04857 (N.D. Ill. filed Feb. 13, 2018) ("[Tlhe franchise operator, not McDonald's,
exclusively controls all aspects of [restaurant employees'] employment - from hiring and firing, to
setting and paying wages, to scheduling, supervision, and discipline." (quoting Brief for Defendants
Appellees McDonald's Corp. et al., at 1, Salazar, 944 F.3d 1024) (9th Cir. 2019) (No. 17-15673)
(emphasis in original and bold added in sur-reply)).
109. Id. at 4-5.
110. Defendant's Response to Plaintiff's Sur-Reply in Opposition to Defendant's Motion to
Dismiss at 1-2, Deslandes v. McDonalds, No. 17-cv-04857 (N.D. Ill. filed Feb. 16, 2018).
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McDonald's motion to dismiss as to plaintiffs claim of a Sherman Act
violation in Count I and granted the motion as to the state law violations in
Counts II and Ill.11' The court identified the case as involving "a restraint
'1 12
affecting competition in the supply of an input (labor) for a final product."
The court found that Deslandes alleged a horizontal trade restraint while also
agreeing with McDonald's that the restraint contained vertical elements. It
explained that "McDonald's, by including the no-hire provision in its
agreement with franchisees, was protecting its own restaurants (i.e., itself)
from horizontal competition for employees."11 3 The court further found,
however, that the no-hire restraint was only ancillary to the franchise
agreement - as evidenced by McDonald's continued use of franchise
agreements that do not contain such limitations - and as such, could not be
per se unlawful. 4 It stated that "[a] restraint is ancillary if it promoted
enterprise and productivity when it was adopted."' 15 It explained that "[e]ach
time McDonald's entered a franchise agreement, it increased output of
burgers and fries, which is to say the agreement was output enhancing and
thus procompetitive." ' 16 The court essentially found that because the no-hire
provision was ancillary to McDonald's franchise agreement, the provision
could not be deemed per se unlawful but had to be reviewed under the quicklook analysis." 7
The court analyzed whether Deslandes had stated a claim under the
quick-look analysis and concluded that she had." 8 It explained that "[e]ven
a person with a rudimentary understanding of economics would understand
that if competitors agree not to hire each other's employees, wages for
employees will stagnate."' 9 The court addressed McDonald's assertion that
the no-hire clause had procompetitive benefits, i.e., promoting interbrand
competition. 2° In rejecting McDonald's interbrand argument, the court
explained:
[T]his case is not about competition for the sale of hamburgers to
consumers. It is about competition for employees, and, in the market for
employees, the McDonald's franchisees and [corporate franchisees] within
a locale are direct, horizontal, competitors. . . . [T]hey are alleged to have
111. Deslandes v. McDonalds, No. 17-cv-04857, 2018 WL 3105955, at *10 (N.D. Ill. June
25, 2018).
112. Id. at *7.
113. Id. at *11.
114. Id. at * 13.

115. Id. at *7 (citation and quotation omitted).
116.
117.
118.
119.
120.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at *8.
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divided the market for employees by prohibiting restaurants from hiring each
other's current or former (for the prior six months, anyway) employees. In
the employment market, the various McDonald's stores are competing
brands. Dividing the market does not promote intrabrand competition for
employees; it stifles interbrand competition. 1 '
The court also found that the no-hire provision does not promote
intrabrand competition because it "is not limited to management employees
who had received expensive training at Hamburger University,"' 2 2 applies to
all employees (even those at the entry level), and is not "limited to a
reasonable period of time (say six months) after the employee had received
the expensive training at Hamburger University." '23 It noted that an
employer's fear of losing trained employees is insufficient to justify the use
of a no-hire agreement. It specifically noted that to encourage employees to
stay, employers can pay higher wages and contract directly with employees
as to terms of employment.12 4 Notably, as explored further within this article,
the court did not address Deslandes's assertion that McDonald's was taking
conflicting positions. The action is still pending in the district court.
3. Discussion
After the commencement of the suit, McDonald's and other franchisors
stated that they would remove the no-hire clause from future franchise
agreements.'2 5 In an agreement with Attorney General (AG) Bob Ferguson
of Washington State, McDonald's agreed to remove no-hire clauses in its
franchise agreements with franchisees in Washington State within sixty
days.'26 While McDonald's agreed with AG Ferguson not to enforce the nohire provisions nationally, it did not consent to removing the clauses in all of
its existing franchise agreements. It simply promised to not have the

121. Id.
122. Id. According to Rob Lauber, Senior VP and Chief Learning Officer for McDonald's
Corporation, "[c]osts for executing the programs at Hamburger University are shared between
McDonald's and its franchisees. As such, there are no costs for participants." David A. Tomar,
HamburgerUniversity: A McDonald's College Education, THE QUAD MAG., <https://thebestschools.org
/magazine/mcdonalds-hamburger-university/> (last visited Feb. 16, 2020).
123. Deslandes, No. 17-cv-04857, 2018 WL 3105955, at *8.
124. Id.
125. Abrams, supranote 70.
126. Press Release, Wash. Attorney Gen., AG Ferguson Announces Fast-Food Chains Will
End Restrictions on Low-Wage Workers Nationwide (July 12, 2018), <https://www.atg.wa.gov/
news/news-releases/ag-ferguson-announces-fast-food-chains-wi l-end-restrictions-low-wage-workers>
("McDonald's previously announced that it would no longer enforce no-poach clauses found in its
franchise agreements, and announced it would no longer include these clauses in contracts with new
franchises.").
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provision in any agreements entered into with new franchisees. 127 Therefore,
the agreement does not affect any franchisees who are currently operating
under existing franchise agreements that contain the no-hire provision. These
franchise agreements, on average, have a twenty-year lifespan.1 28 Thus, the
issue is not moot and remains viable until at least 2037. Also, as previously
mentioned, resolution of this issue has broad implications and affects a large
class of workers. Moreover, it is unclear under what authority AG Ferguson
can enforce violations that occur in another state or how he will learn of such
violations.
B. OtherLawsuits
After Deslandes commenced her suit against McDonald's, Kristen Ion
sued Pizza Hut, LLC, 129 and Sylas Butler filed against Jimmy John's. 3' 0 Like
Deslandes, they alleged that the no-hire clauses in the defendants' franchise
agreements violated Section 1 of the Sherman Act and state laws.'31 They
maintained that the provisions restricted competition, suppressed wages, and
32
restrained trade.'
The no-hire agreements involved in the Pizza Huts and Jimmy John's
actions differed slightly from the McDonald's agreement in Deslandes. For
example, Pizza Hut's no-hire clause applied only to managers who had
worked at Pizza Hut locations for the previous six months in managerial
positions. 33 Jimmy John's franchise agreement included not only a no-hire
clause preventing franchisees from hiring each other's employees, but also a
clause making all current and future franchisees third-party beneficiaries
with the right to enforce the no-hire provision.' 4 Jimmy John's agreement
further provided franchisees, separate from the franchise agreement, with a
noncompete agreement for use with all restaurant employees.' 35 The
noncompete agreement was a contractual relationship between the
franchisee and the employee. It was not, however, a notice to the employee
127. See id. (stating that McDonalds "announced it would no longer include these clauses in

contracts with new franchises" and that its agreement with the Washington Attorney General "requires
McDonald's to remove no-poach language in its contracts with Washington state locations within 60
days").
FRANCHISE
DIRECT,
Cost
&
Fees,
Franchise
128. McDonald's
<https://www.franchisedirect.com/foodfranchises/mcdonalds-franchise-07030/ufoc/> (last visited Feb.
16, 2020).
129. Complaint, Ion v. Pizza Hut, LLC, No. 17-cv-00788 (E.D. Tex. dismissed July 16,2018).
130. Butler v. Jimmy John's Franchise LLC, No. 18-cv-00133 (S.D. Ill. filed Jan. 24, 2018).
131. Complaint at 15, ]on, No. 17-cv-00788; Complaint at 2, Butler, No. 18-cv-00133.
132. Complaint at 23-72, Ion, No. 17-cv-00788; Complaint at 38-45, Butler, No. 18-cv-001 33.

133. Complaint at 2, Ion, No. 17-cv-00788.
134. Complaint at 85, Butler, No. 18-cv-00133.
135. Id. at 21-22.
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as a third party to the no-hire clause.
Like McDonald's, defendants Pizza Hut and Jimmy John's moved to
dismiss the complaints,' 36 alleging that the plaintiffs had failed to state
Sherman Act claims under the per se rule or the rule of reason.' 37 More
specifically, they contended that Ion and Butler failed to allege the existence
of horizontal agreements. 138 The suit against Pizza Hut was voluntarily
dismissed before the court ruled on the motion to dismiss or addressed any
of the substantive issues before it. 131
In the case against Jimmy John's, Butler, the district court issued an
40
order granting in part and denying in part Jimmy John's motion to dismiss. 1
The court had found that Butler stated a plausible Sherman Act violation
under the hub-and-spoke conspiracy theory.' 4' The court found the effect of
the no-hire agreement to be "(1) a horizontal boycott of certain employees;
and (2) a horizontal price-fixing scheme to suppress the price of labor for
said employees -just as Butler has pled."1 42 The state claims were dismissed.
Like Deslandes, Butler is still pending.
IV. FRAMEWORK FOR UNDERSTANDING NLRB'S JOINT-EMPLOYER
STANDARD

This section explores the NLRB's current joint employment standard,
starting with the Browning-Ferris saga and the Board's proposed rule.
Analyzing the NLRB's current, albeit uncertain, joint employment standard
will set the foundation for understanding how McDonald's intraprise system
argument in Deslandes directly contradicts its position in the joint employer
litigation.
136. Motion to Dismiss Plaintiff's Complaint under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6),
Ion v. Pizza Hut, LLC, No. 17-cv-00788 (E.D. Tex. Jan. 11,2018); Defendants' Memorandum in Support
of their Motion to Dismiss Plaintiffs Complaint under Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 12(b)(1) and
12(b)(6), Butler v. Jimmy John's Franchise LLC, No. 18-cv-00133 (S.D. Ill. filed Mar. 21, 2018).
137. Motion to Dismiss at 6-21, Ion, No. 17-cv-00788; Memorandum in Support of Motion to
Dismiss at 7-18, Butler, No. 18-cv-00133.
138. Motion to dismiss at 3-18, Ion, No. 17-cv-00788; Memorandum in Support of Motion to
Dismiss at 12-14, Butler, No. 18-cv-00133.
139. Notice of dismissal without prejudice pursuant to Rule 41 (A)(1), Ion v. Pizza Hut, LLC,
No. 17-cv-00788 (E.D. Tex. issued July 6, 2018).
140. Butler v. Jimmy John's Franchise, LLC, 331 F. Supp. 3d 786 (S.D. 111.2018).
141. The court explained the theory as follows:
Jimmy John's corporate enters into a franchise agreement with each franchisee,
which contains the no-hire provision. The franchisees tacitly agree amongst each
other to enforce the no-hire provision through austere enforcement of the employee
non-compete contracts. And most damningly, the franchise agreements give the
franchisees a contractual tight to enforce the no-hire agreements directly against
each other through the third-party beneficiary provision.
Jd. at 796.
142. Id.
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A. The Browning-FerrisSaga: 2015 Browning-Ferrisand Hy-Brand
For over thirty years, the NLRB narrowly interpreted the defmition of
"joint employer" under the National Labor Relations Act (NLRA).143 The
central element in determining whether an employer was a joint employer
was "whether a putative joint employer's control over employment matters
is direct and immediate.""' To establish joint-employer status, "there must
be a showing that the employer meaningfully affects matters relating to the
employment relationship such as hiring, firing, discipline, supervision, and
direction."' 4 5 Then, in 2015, under the leadership of Chairman Mark Pearce,
the Board revisited and overruled the longstanding joint-employer standard
and reinstated the standard from NLRB v. Browning-FerrisIndustries of
46
PennsylvaniaInc.
Under the new standard, "two or more statutory employers are joint
employers of the same statutory employees if they 'share or codetermine
those matters governing the essential terms and conditions of
employment. '""" The Board stated that it was returning to the "traditional
test" in Browning-Ferrisand that it would "no longer require that a joint
employer not only possess the authority to control employees' terms and
conditions of employment, but must also exercise that authority, and do so
directly, immediately, and not in a 'limited and routine' manner."'" It
announced that
[i]n determining whether a putative joint employer meets
this standard, the initial inquiry is whether there is a
common-law employment relationship with the employees
in question. If this common-law employment relationship
exists, the inquiry then turns to whether the putative joint

143. See In re Wiers Int'l Trucks, Inc., 353 N.L.R.B. 475,487 (2008) ("The essential element

in this analysis is whether the putative joint employer's control over employment matters is direct and
immediate." (citation omitted)); Summit Express, Inc., 350 N.L.R.B. 592, 592 n.3 (2007) ("[Wje find

that the contract terms, by themselves, do not establish direct and immediate control over the terms and
conditions of employment ... required to prove a joint employer relationship."); TLI, Inc., 271 N.L.R.B.
798 (1984); Laerco Transp., 269 N.L.R.B. 324 (1984).
144. In Re Airborne Freight Co., 338 N.L.R.B. 597, 597 n.1 (2002) (citing TLI, Inc., 271
N.L.R.B. at 798-99).
145. TLI, Inc., 271 N.L.R.B. at 798 (citation omitted).

146. Browning-Ferris Indus., Inc. 362 N.L.R.B. 1599, 1613-14 (2015) (citing NLRB v.
Browning-Ferris Indus. ofPa., Inc., 691 F. 2d 1117 (3d Cir. 1982)).
147. Id. at 1600 (quoting Browning-Ferris Indus. of Pa., Inc., 691 F.2d at 1123). Although the
two cases involve Browning-Ferris Industries, one in California and the other in Pennsylvania, I have not
found any reasons in the cases themselves or supporting literature explaining the coincidence in names
and the thirty-three-year difference.
148. Id. at 1612-14.
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employer possesses sufficient control over employees'
essential terms and conditions of employment to permit
49
meaningful collective bargaining. 1
The Board explained that essential terms and conditions of employment
not only included the then-current "'matters relating to the employment
relationship such as hiring, firing, discipline, supervision, and direction' '. ' 5
but also included "wages and hours, as reflected in the [NLRA]" and other
factors, such as "dictating the number of workers to be supplied; controlling
scheduling, seniority, and overtime; and assigning work and determining the
manner and method of work performance."'' It reaffirmed that the commonlaw concept of control informed its standard, as well as "the actual exercise
'
of control, whether direct or indirect." 152
With this new "traditional" standard in mind, the Board examined the
case before it. BFI Newby Island Recyclery (BFI) owned and operated a
recycling facility.153 Leadpoint Business Services (Leadpoint) served as a
work agency and provided people to work at BFI. The two companies had
entered into a temporary labor services agreement that controlled their
relationship.' 54 The issue addressed by the Board was whether BFI was a
joint employer of the workers provided to it by Leadpoint."'
The plant's drivers and loaders [at the facility] were
employed directly by BFI and were represented by the
Teamsters. Several hundred sorters, screen cleaners, and
housekeepers who also worked at the facility wished to join
the union. The problem: they were employed not by BFI but
by Leadpoint, a subcontractor.... Under the BFI-Leadpoint
arrangement, BFI and Leadpoint jointly decided many of
the terms and conditions of the Leadpoint workers, but only
56
Leadpoint exercised direct and immediate control.1
The Union subsequently petitioned to represent the workers, bringing
the matter before the Board. Applying the newly announced "traditional"
149. Id. at 1600.
150. Id. at 1600 n.5 (quoting TLI, Inc., 271 N.L.R.B. at 798).
151. Id. at 1613 (citations omitted).
152. Id. at 1623 (citations omitted)
153. Id. at 1600.
154. Id. at 1600-01.
155. Id. at 1599.
156. Kate Andrias, The New Labor Law, 126 Yale L.J. 2, 58 (2016) (describing the facts of
Browning-Ferris)(citations omitted).
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joint-employment standard, the Board found that "BFI's role in sharing and
codetermining the terms and conditions of employment establishes that it is
a joint employer with Leadpoint." '57 The Board examined the parties'
agreement and concluded that
BFI is an employer under common-law principles, and the
facts demonstrate that it shares or codetermines those
matters governing the essential terms and conditions of
employment for the Leadpoint employees. In many relevant
respects, its right to control is indisputable. Moreover, it has
exercised that control, both directly and indirectly. Finding
joint-employer status here is consistent with common-law
principles, and it serves the purposes of the National Labor
Relations Act. 58
Subsequently, in Hy-Brand Industrial Contractors,Ltd., a new Board
majority "overrule[d] Browning-Ferris and restore[d] to the joint-employer
standard that existed prior to that decision. 1 59 It found that the "BrowningFerris standard is a distortion of common law as interpreted by the Board
and the courts, it is contrary to the Act, it is ill-advised as a matter of policy,
and its application would prevent the Board from discharging one of its
primary responsibilities under the Act, which is to foster stability in labormanagement relations." 6 ' The Board returned to the pre-Browning-Ferris
standard as enunciated in TLI, Inc. and concluded that joint-employer status
turns on "whether joint control is exercised (rather than merely reserved),
whether such control has a 'direct and immediate' impact on employment
terms (rather than a merely indirect impact), and whether such control is not
merely 'limited and routine"" 6 Thereafter, on February 26, 2018, the Board
issued an order vacating its decision in Hybrand, again returning to the 2015
1 62
Browning-Ferrisstandard.
B. NLRB's ProposedRule
Seeking to return to the pre-Browning-Ferrisstandard, on September
157. Browning-Ferris,362 N.L.R.B. at 1618.
158. Id. at 1616.
159. 365 N.L.R.B. No. 156, at 1 (Dec. 14, 2017).
160. Id.at 2.
161. Id.at 34.
162. Hy-Brand Indus. Contractors, Ltd., 366 N.L.R.B. No. 26 (Feb. 26, 2018); see also Press
Release, NLRB, Board Vacates Hy-Brand Decision (Feb. 26, 2018), <https://www.nrb.gov/newsoutreach/news-story/board-vacates-hy-brand-decision>.
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14, 2018, the Board published in the Federal Register a Notice of Proposed
1 63
Rulemaking as to the standard for determining joint-employer status.
Under the proposed rule, an employer may be considered a joint
employer of a separate employer's employees only if the two employers
share or codetermine the employees' essential terms and conditions of
employment, such as hiring, firing, discipline, supervision, and direction. A
putative joint employer must possess and actually exercise substantial direct
and immediate control over the employees' essential terms and conditions of
employment in a manner that is not limited and routine.' 64
The Board accepted written comments on the proposed rule until
65
January 28, 2019, extending the time for comment three times. 1
C. The Browning-FerrisAppeal
During the comment period, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the District
of Columbia Circuit issued its decision in the Browning-Ferris66 saga. The
court affirmed "the Board's determination that both reserved authority to
control and indirect control can be relevant factors in the joint-employer
analysis."' 67 It confirmed that "the common-law analysis of joint-employer
status can factor in both (i) an employer's authorized but unexercised forms
of control, and (ii) an employer's indirect control over employees' terms and
conditions of employment."'' 68 The court, however,
also found that the Board
69
incorrectly applied the indirect control test.
The court explained that the Board had failed to differentiate between
indirect control factors that are relevant to employer status (matters
involving essential terms and conditions of employment) and the typical
terms of contracting (including objectives, basic ground rules, and
163. The Standard for Determining Joint-Employer Status, 83 Fed. Reg. 46681 (proposed
Sept. 14, 2018); Press Release, NLRB, Board Proposes Rule to Change its Joint-Employer Standard
(Sept. 13, 2018), <https://www.nlrb.gov/news-outreach/news-story/board-proposes-rule-change-itsjoint-employer-standard>.
164. The Standard for Determining Joint-Employer Status, 83 Fed. Reg. at 46686.
165. Press Release, NLRB, NLRB Extends Time for Submitting Comments on Proposed
Joint-Employer Rulemaking (Oct. 30, 2018), <https://www.nlrb.gov/news-outreach/news-story/nlrbextends-time-submitting-comments-proposed-joint-employer-rulemaking>;
Press Release, NLRB,
NLRB Further Extends Time for Submitting Comments on Proposed Joint-Employer Rulemaking (Dec.
10, 2018), <https://www.nlrb.gov/news-outreach/news-story/nlrb-further-extends-time-submittingcomments-proposed-joint-employer>; Press Release, NLRB, NLRB Further Extends Time for
Submitting Comments on Proposed Joint-Employer Rulemaking in Light of DC Circuit's Recent
Browning-Ferris Decision (Jan. 11, 2019), <https:// www.nlrb.gov/news-outreach/news-story/nlrbfurther-extends-time-submitting-comments-proposed-joint-employer- I>.
166. Browning-Fenis Indus. of Cal., Inc. v. NLRB, 911 F.3d 1195 (D.C. Cir. 2018).
167. Id. at 1222.
168. Id. at 1209 (citation omitted).
169. Id. at 1222-23.
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expectations for a third-party contractor).17 0 Ultimately, the court remanded
the matter to the Board to articulate the boundaries of indirect control
sufficient to establish a joint171employment relationship and did not determine
joint-employment liability.
It is unclear how the court's ruling will affect the Board's ongoing
deliberations and proposed rule. The majority in the Browning-Ferrisappeal
explained that it accepted the appeal, despite the Board's pending
rulemaking, because Congress has vested the courts, and not the Board, with
the authority to define "employer." It stated that "[tihe Board's rulemaking.
' 172
.must color within the common-law lines identified by the judiciary,"
thus implying that any rule announced by the Board would have to comply
with the Browning-Ferris appeal decision. However, Senior Judge
Randolph, in his dissent, disagreed with the majority and instead asserted
that the majority "neglect[ed] the judiciary's responsibility to avoid
interfering with an agency's ongoing rulemaking proceedings.' 1 73 The jointemployer issue will likely be addressed by the Supreme Court. 174 With a
on the Court, a Supreme Court decision may not bode
conservative majority
5
17

well for workers.

D. Reactions to the Board'sProposedJoint-EmployerRule
On March 14, 2019, after the close of the final time for comment,
Representatives Bobby Scott and Frederica Wilson issued a letter to Board
Chairman John Ring, raising concerns about the Board's plan to outsource
the task of reviewing the nearly 29,000 public comments. 176 Representatives
Scott and Wilson specifically questioned whether outsourcing a regulatory
task was the best use of the Board's resources since it has qualified
professional staff who are accustomed to such reviews and whether
170. Id. at 1219-20.
171. Id. at 1223.
172. Id. at 1208.
173. Id. at 1227.
174. See Moshe Z. Marvit, The Joint-Employment Standard in Limbo, THE REGULATORY
REV. (Apr. 2, 2019), <https://www.theregreview.org/2019/04/02/marvit-joint-employment-standardlimbo/>.
175. Id. ([The Court's] analysis and [dicta in Harris v. Quinn, 573 U.S. 616 (2014),] may
provide some grounding for it to overturn the NLRB's Browning-Ferrisjoint-employment test as well.
If the Court sticks to its unworkably narrow standard, it would have enormous practical effects of pushing
millions of workers outside the protections of labor law, while providing yet another incentive to subject

workers to an unnecessarily complicated workplace arrangement.").
176. Letter from Robert C. "Bobby" Scott, Chairman U.S. House Comm. on Educ. & Labor,
and Frederica S. Wilson, Chairwoman, U.S. House Subcomm. on Health, Emp., Labor & Pensions, to
John Ring, Chairman, NLRB (Mar. 14, 2019), <https://edlabor.house.gov/imo/media/doc/2019-03-

14%20Lettero20to%20NLRB%20about%20Contracting%20Review%20oI,
0Rule.pdfP.

20Joint%20Employer%2
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contracting with a private company created an appearance of a conflict of

interest. 177
Chairman Ring responded to Representatives Scott and Wilson's letter,
seeking to allay their concerns and explaining the Board's plans to review
the comments. 178 He explained that the Board would use temporary support,
which would be overseen by NLRB staff, to sort and code the comments to
prepare for substantive review. He further explained that the work conducted
by temporary staff would involve no substantive or deliberate review of the

comments. 179
As of the time of this article, the Board has not published the final
version of the j oint-employer rule. But it is clear that under the current Board,
the pre-Browning-Ferrisstandard as stated in TLI will become the standard
once again.
In an attempt to clarify the joint-employment standard in franchising,
on August 1, 2019, Senator Angus King (I-Maine), along with co-sponsors
James Lankford (R-Oklahoma), John Cornyn (R-Texas), Kyrsten Sinema
(D-Arizona), Joe Manchin (D-West Virginia), Mike Braun (R-Indiana), and
Kevin Cramer (R-North Dakota), sponsored the Trademark Licensing
Protection Act of 2019.180 "The bill would amend existing trademark law to
allow franchises to license their brands without requiring them to participate
in collective bargaining or be held responsible for wage and labor violations
committed by a franchisee." 8 ' The proposed amendment seemingly seeks to
define joint employer, albeit through trademark law.' 82 However, Skopos
Lab predicts there is only a three percent chance of the bill passing. Also, it
is contemplated that the DOL's new joint-employer rule, 83 defining joint

177. Id. at 1-2.
178. Letter from John F. Ring, Chairman, NLRB, to Robert C. "Bobby" Scott, Chairman U.S.
House Comm. on Educ. & Labor, and Frederica S. Wilson, Chairwoman, U.S. House Subcomm. on
Health, Emp., Labor & Pensions (Mar. 22, 2019), <https://www.nlrb.gov/sites/defaultU
files/attachments/news-story/node-7206/3222019 - nlrb chairman ring-response-letter.pdf>.
179. Id. at 1-2.
180. Trademark Licensing Protection Act of 2019, S. 2439, 116th Cong. (2019).
181. Benjamin Glick, No Summer Break for Labor Department New Rules and Leadership
Shakeup Keeps Workplace Regulators and Lawmakers Busy in August, MIDDLE MKT. GROWTH (Aug.
14,
2019),
<https://middlemarketgrowth.org/advocacy-updates-no-summer-break-for-labordepartment/>.
182. Trademark Licensing Protection Act of 2019, S. 2439, 116th Cong. (stating that the
purpose of bill is "[t]o amend the Trademark Act of 1946 to provide that the licensing of a mark for use
by a related company may not be construed as establishing an employment relationship between the
owner of the mark, or an authorizing person, and either that related company or the employees of that
related company, and for other purposes.").
183. Joint Employer Status Under the Fair Labor Standards Act, 84 Fed. Reg. 14043 (proposed
Apr. 9, 2019), <https://www.federalregister.gov/documents/2 0 19/04/09/2019-065 0 0/J oint-employerstatus-under-the-fair-labor-standards-act>; DOL Proposes New Joint-Employer Rule, SULLIVAN &

308

EMPLOYEE RIGHTS AND EMPLOYMENT POLICY JOURNAL

[Vol. 23:2

employer under the Fair Labor Standard Act (FLSA), will further affect the
NLRB's rulemaking. 8 4 A discussion of the DOL's rule and decisions,
however, is beyond the scope of this article.
V. JOINT-EMPLOYER CASE STUDY: SALAZAR V. MCDONALD'S

A. Lawsuits againstMcDonald's
The Board's new joint-employment standard in Browning-Ferriscame
about during the "Fight for $15" campaign, organized by the Service
Employees International Union (SEIU).' 85 Fight for $15 is comprised of
"fast-food workers, home health aides, child care teachers, airport workers,
adjunct professors, retail employees - and underpaid workers
'
It seeks to raise the minimum wage to $15 an hour and to
everywhere."186
secure the right to form a union in various low-wage industries. Its primary
strategy has been to hold multi-city rallies and coordinated nationwide
strikes. 187
"While the legal arguments [in Browning-Ferris]were still pending
before the NLRB in Washington, organizers and workers.., filed numerous
unfair labor practice charges against both McDonald's and franchise owners,
claiming that workers faced retaliation for participating in Fight for $15
activity."' 8 SEIU argued that McDonald's was a joint employer under the
CROMWELL LLP (Apr. 26, 2019), <https://www.sullcrom.com/blogs-dol-proposes-new-joint-employerrule>.
Following a path similar to the NLRB, in 2017 the DOL withdrew its 2016
guidance, and most recently, on April 9, 2019, issued a proposed rule to revise
joint-employment regulations under the FLSA. The DOL proposed a four-factor
test that would analyze whether the putative joint employer actually exercises the
power to: (1) hire or fire an employee; (2) supervise and control an employee's
work schedules or employment conditions; (3) determine an employee's rate and
method of pay; and (4) maintain a worker's employment records. Significantly, as
with the NLRB's proposed standard, this change would remove the threat of
businesses being deemed joint employers solely because they have the right to
control a worker.
Christopher D. Durham & Meredith Grant, The CurrentState ofJoint Employment Standards,QSR MAG.
(Apr. 2019), <https://www.qsrmagazine.com/legal/current-state-joint-employment-standards>.
184. "The unsettled nature of the joint employment standard under the NLRA is further
complicated by the fact that there have been a number of significant, and not entirely consistent, decisions
regarding the joint employment concept under the FLSA." Tess Hardy, Big Brands, Big Responsibilities?
An Examination of FranchisorAccountability for Employment Contraventions in the United States,
Canada, and Australia,40 COMP. LAB. L. & POL'Y J. 285, 310 (2019).
185. About Us, FIGHT FOR $15, <https://fightforl 5.org/about-us/> (last visited Feb. 16, 2020).
186. Id.
187. For Workers, FIGHT FOR $15, <https://fightforl 5.org/for-workers/> (last visited Feb. 16,
2020); see also Steven Greenhouse, How to Get Low-Wage Workers Into the Middle Class, THE
ATLANTIC (Aug. 19, 2015), <https://www.theatlantic.com/business/archive/2015/08/fifteen-dollarsminimum-wage/401540/>.
188. Andrias, supra note 156, at 60.
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then-existing, narrow standard.
The charges resulted in the NLRB's General Counsel issuing
consolidated complaints against McDonald's on December 19, 2014.189
The complaints allege that McDonald's USA, LLC and certain
franchisees violated the rights of employees working at McDonald's
restaurants at various locations around the country by, among other things,
making statements and taking actions against them for engaging in activities
aimed at improving their wages and working conditions, including
participating in nationwide fast food worker protests about their terms and
190
conditions of employment during the past two years.

The cases against McDonald's were consolidated and proceeded before
an Administrative Law Judge (ALJ). The case commenced in 2015 and has
91
involved lengthy litigation replete with evidentiary hearings and motions.
On March 19, 2018, General Counsel and McDonald's presented "30
informal agreements, each addressing the allegations against one franchisee,
and executed by that franchisee and McDonald's. The agreements were to
serve as a 'template' for the settlement of other McDonald's cases which had
not been consolidated" 192 as part of the underlying case. After setting forth
its rationale in a well-reasoned opinion that recited the lengthy history of the
case, the ALJ found that approval of the settlement agreement was not
warranted "[g]iven the size and import of this case, the resources expended
in the hearing presentations, the terms of the proposed settlement, and the
193
distinct possibility of additional litigation.'
At this juncture, "McDonald's and the NLRB General Counsel are
faced with three options: to abandon the settlement negotiations and resume
the trial; to forge a settlement agreement on new terms; or to appeal the
decision to the NLRB.""' Should the matter be appealed to the NLRB, "it
may well be that the fate of the test case against McDonald's - and the
189. Press Release, NLRB, NLRB Office of the General Counsel Issues Consolidated
Complaints Against McDonald's Franchisees and their Franchisor McDonald's, USA, LLC as Joint
Employers (Dec. 19, 2014), <https://www.nlrb.gov/news-outreach/news-story/nlrb-office-generalcounsel-issues-consolidated-complaints-against>.
190. Id.
191. Docket Activity, McDonalds USA, LLC, Case No. 02-CA-093893, NLRB,
<https://www.nlrb.gov/case/02-CA-093893> (last visited Feb. 16, 2020).
192. Lisa Milam-Perez, NLRB Law Judge Rejects ProposedSettlement in McDonald'sJoint
Employer Litigation, WOLTERS KLUWER <http://www.employmentlawdaily.com/index.php/news/nlrblaw-judge-rejects-proposed-settlement-in-mcdonalds-joint-employer-litigation/> (last visited Feb. 16,
2020); see also Order Denying Motions to Approve Settlement Agreements at 1, McDonalds USA, LLC,
Case Nos. 02-CA-093893, et al., (NLRB ALJ July 17, 2018), <http://hr.cch.com/ELD/
McDonaldsUSA071718.pdf>.
193. Order Denying Motions to Approve Settlement Agreements at 40, McDonalds USA,
LLC, Case Nos. 02-CA-093893, et al.
194. Hardy, supra note 184, at 310.
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expansiveness or otherwise of the joint employment standard which is
applied - will ultimately turn on the political constitution of the Board."' 95
The matter remains pending.
B. Salazar v. McDonald's
In 2016, while the consolidated case against McDonald's was
proceeding, Plaintiffs Guadalupe Salazar, Judith Zarate, and Genoveva
Lopez - employees at a franchisee-owned and -operated McDonald's
restaurant - sued McDonald's and the franchisee in the U.S. District Court
for the Northern District of California.' 9 6 Plaintiffs claimed, among other
things, that the franchisee and McDonald's failed to pay them in compliance
with the California Labor Code.'97 They sought to hold McDonald's liable
under a joint-employer theory.' 98 Plaintiffs settled with the franchisee and
agreed to dismiss the case against it.' 99 Immediately after the claims were
dismissed against the franchisee, McDonald's moved for summary
judgment.0 °
In its motion for summary judgment "McDonald['s] assert[ed] it [did]
not employ the workers because it [did] not retain or exert direct or indirect
control over their hiring, firing, wages, or working conditions."' ' Plaintiffs,
however, maintained that "McDonald['s] contractual and economic power,
coupled with its regular monitoring of [the franchisee's] compliance with its
standards, enable[d] McDonald['s] to maintain operational control over all
relevant workplace conditions."'2' 2
Applying California law, the court granted the motion in part and denied
it in part. Viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to plaintiffs, the
court agreed with McDonald's that it did not "retain or exert direct or indirect
control over plaintiffs' hiring, firing, wages, hours, or material working
conditions. Nor did McDonald['s] suffer or permit plaintiffs to work, engage
in an actual agency relationship, participate in a conspiracy, or aid and abet
the alleged wage and hour violations."20 3 The court did, however, find that
"a jury could reasonably find McDonald['s] to be a joint employer by virtue

195. Id.
196. Salazar v. McDonald's Corp., No. 14-CV-02096-RS, 2016 WL 4394165, at *1 (N.D.
Cal. Aug. 16, 2016).
197. Id.
198. Id.
199. Id.at *2.
200. Id.

201.Id. at *3.
202. Id.
203. Id.at *14.
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of an ostensible agency relationship. '' 2° "Ostensible agency exists where (1)
the person dealing with the agent does so with reasonable belief in the
agent's authority; (2) that belief is 'generated by some act or neglect of the
principal sought to be charged,' and (3) the relying party is not negligent. 2 °5
McDonald's subsequently moved for summary judgment for a second
time, arguing that the California Labor Code's employer definition does not
include ostensible agency.2 6 The court agreed and rejected plaintiff's
assertion that McDonald's was liable for the labor code violations under the
ostensible agency theory.207 Judgment was entered for McDonald's on all
counts.2 8 Plaintiffs appealed.
In plaintiffs' brief on appeal, they alleged that the district court erred in
finding that, as a matter of law, McDonald's could not be a joint employer
under the labor code.20 9 McDonald's filed an answer brief, in which it argued
that the district court properly granted summary judgment.21 0 Of particular
relevance here, it asserted that "the franchise operator, not McDonald's,
exclusively controls all aspects of plaintiffs' employment- from hiring and
firing, to setting and paying wages, to scheduling, supervision, and
discipline. 2 1' Throughout its argument on appeal, McDonald's reiterated
that it does not exercise control in plaintiffs working conditions and
highlighted that it has no involvement in the hiring or firing of the
franchisee's employee.212 Pointedly, it maintained that its "business manuals
(referenced in the [a]greements) vest authority over hiring and firing
workers, setting wages and hours, and telling workers when and where to
21 3
report to work exclusively in the franchisee.
McDonald's acknowledged in its answer brief that the McDonald's
system, as established and enforced via the franchise agreement "ensures
protection of McDonald's brand, including the physical appearance of the
building and processes necessary to 'prepare a unified product.' 2 4 Despite
204. Id. at *12-13.
205. Ochoa v. McDonald's Corp., 133 F. Supp. 3d 1228, 1239 (N.D. Cal. 2015)
(quoting Kaplan v. Coldwell Banker Residential Affiliates, Inc., 59 Cal. App. 4th 741, 747 (1997))
(denying summary judgment because there was reasonable basis for finding McDonald's corporation to
be ajoint employer with its franchisee under an ostensible agency theory).
206. Salazar, No. 14-CV-02096-RS, 2016 WL 4394165, at *1-2.
207. Id. at *3.
208. Id. at *4.
209. Plaintiffs-Appellants' Opening Brief at 14-50, Salazar v. McDonald's Corp., 944 F.3d
1024 (9th Cir. 2019) (No. 17-15673).
210. Brief for Defendants-Appellees McDonald's Corp. et al. at 17-56, Salazar,944 F.3d 1044
(9th Cir. 2019) (No. 17-15673).
211. Id.at 1.
212. Id. at 8-10, 13-15, 22-23, 25.
213. Id.at6.
214. Id. at43.
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the acknowledgment, it argued that the agreement "says nothing about what
level of 'control' McDonald's exercises over plaintiffs, nor contradicts the
understanding elsewhere in the [a]greements that '[franchisee] and
McDonald's are not and do not intend to be ... joint employers in any
way. ' '215 It also asserted that "[i]t is entirely consistent with [state law] (and
the franchising model generally) for a franchisor to encourage franchisees to
adopt the brand's best practices. But [it maintained] that [this] cannot create
of actual franchisor control over
ajoint employer relationship in the absence
26
wages, hours, or working conditions. 1
VI. THE CONFLICT

Having now explored the proper antitrust and labor law framework, in
this section, I will address the conflicting views taken by McDonald's in the
antitrust case, Deslandes, and in the joint-employer case, Salazar. I argue
that franchisors like McDonald's should not be able to assert control over
their franchisees and their franchisees' employees in some situations and
then disavow it in others.
A. Deslandes and Salazar,the Tension Explored
McDonald's position in the Deslandes antitrust case, like most
franchisors, is that it is in an intrabrand franchise system with its franchisees
and as such, it can engage in coordination by using no-hire agreements. 1 7
This position conflicts with McDonald's assertion in Salazarthat it plays no
part in franchise employees' terms and conditions of employment because
no-hire agreements directly control franchise employees' hiring.21 8
The problem with McDonald's position in the antitrust case is best
illustrated by its citation to Williams v. Nevada219 in support of its assertion
that the no-hire agreements fulfill the economic purpose of preventing
franchises from raiding one another's employees. 22 ° McDonald's reliance on
Williams is misplaced and actually works against it. In Williams, the court
analyzed whether a franchisor and its franchisee could conspire to violate
215.Id. at44.
216. Id. at 46.
217. Deslandes v. McDonald's USA, LLC, No. 17-cv-04857, 2018 WL 3105955, at *8
(N.D. 111.June 25, 2018).
218. Brief for Defendants-Appellees McDonald's Corp. et al. at 8-10, Salazar, 944 F.3d
1044 (9th Cir. 2019) (No. 17-15673).
219. 794 F. Supp. 1026 (D. Nev. 1992), aff'd, Williams v. I.B. Fischer Nev., 999 F.2d 445
(9th Cir. 1993).

220. Defendants' Motion to Dismiss Plaintiff's First Amended Complaint at 8 and 11,
Deslandes, No. 17-cv-04857_(N.D. Ill. filed Oct. 2, 2017).

2019]

ANANTITRUST VIOLATION OR EVIDENCE OF JOINT EMPLOYER

313

Section 1 of the Sherman Act by agreeing not to hire each other's managers
via a "no-switching" provision in a franchise agreement. 221 Although the
court ultimately found the franchisor and the franchisee to be a single
enterprise and incapable of conspiring, it did not focus its analysis on the
benefits provided by the "no-switching" clause as asserted by
222
McDonald's.
Besides a few minor differences, the facts in Williams are similar to the
facts in Deslandes.223 The plaintiff desired to work at a different franchise
location but was denied the opportunity due to the provision in the franchise
agreement. The plaintiff sued, alleging violation of Section 1 of the Sherman

Act.
In addressing the Section 1 violation, the court in Williams held that
competition does not exist between a fast-food franchisor and franchisee,
reasoning:
In a fast-food franchise the franchisor does everything to
promote a uniform, non-competitive environment between
the franchises: Each franchise serves substantially the same
products; the products are served to the public in the same
manner; the franchisor develops products and services for
all franchises; the employees dress alike; the decor of each
franchise is similar; the franchises are advertised as a single
enterprise with a single logo; and the franchisor contracts
with each franchise for exclusivity within a certain
geographic224area to minimize competition between the
franchises.

Most notably, the Williams court found that based on a review of the
franchise agreement, the franchisor exercised plenary control over the
franchise operation. 225 The court explained that

221. Williams, 794 F. Supp. at 1030-32.

222. Id. at 1032.
223. The plaintiff in Williams was a manager at a Jack-in-the-Box franchise restaurant in Las
Vegas. Id. at 1029. The restaurant was operated under a franchise agreement entered between the
defendants, the franchisee and the franchisor. Id. Like the McDonald's franchise agreement in Deslandes,
the Jack-in-the-Box franchise agreement contained a provision whereby all of the franchisees agreed to
not hire each other's employees. However, the Jack-in-the-Box provision was limited to only the hiring
of managers who had worked for another franchisee within the prior six months. Id. Plaintiff wished to
relocate and work for a new Jack-in-the-Box franchise that was opening in Arizona. Although he was
offered the manager position at the new location, he was not hired because his employer refused to waive
enforcement of the no switching provision. Id. Plaintiff subsequently commenced an action against the
employer franchisee and the franchisor, alleging, among other claims, that the "no-switching" clause
violated section 1 of the Sherman Act. Id.
224. Id. at 1031.
225. Id. at 1032.
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[i]n the twenty-four page franchise agreement, [the
franchisor] sets operating policies dictating things such as
the restaurant's hours of operation, the type of equipment
that can be used by the restaurant, that the franchisee carry
insurance that is approved by [the franchisor] and even
how far the owner of the franchise may live away from the
restaurant. The agreement goes even farther in allowing
Foodmaker to micro-manage the restaurant by requiring
that Fischer comply with all of the specifications contained
in detailed manuals supplied by Foodmaker. 226
Rather than outright rely on Williams and assert that it functions like a
single entity with its franchisees and it is, as such, immune from section 1
liability, McDonald's tiptoed around the argument; it argued that it is in a
franchise system with its franchisee and can engage in intrabrand
cooperation. Had McDonald's raised the single-entity argument in
Deslandes, it would likely result in a finding that it exercises complete
control over franchise operations, including control over franchise
employees' working conditions. This is what occurred when it raised such
an argument in Abbouds' McDonald's,LLC v. McDonald's Corp. 27
In Abbouds', plaintiff, a McDonald's franchisee, alleged that
McDonald's illegally conspired with other franchisees to prevent it from
purchasing other restaurants in the Seattle area in violation of section 1228
McDonald's moved for summary disposition, arguing that "it is impossible
under law for franchisees and franchisors to conspire in restraint of trade
because they are considered to be a single economic entity [and, as such,
'
Relying on Williams and its
that] [p]laintiff has no antitrust standing."229
factors as to the franchisor's role, the court found plaintiff lacked standing
and there was no conspiracy.
McDonald's franchise system argument is a contrivance that stands at
the precipice of a single-enterprise assertion. It appears that McDonald's
does not allege a single enterprise like it did in Abbouds' because doing so
would require the court to focus on "whether there is a conspiracy between
'separate economic actors pursuing separate economic interests,' such that
the agreement 'deprives the marketplace of independent centers of

226. Id.
227. No. CV04-1895P, 2005 WL 2656591, at *1 (W.D. Wash. Oct. 14, 2005), aff'd, No. 0536032, 2006 WL 1877247 (9th Cir. July 7, 2006).
228. Id.
229. Id. at *3.
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decisionmaking. '230 The court would also apply the Williams factors to
decide whether McDonald's and its franchisees are in a common enterprise
and find that it controls its franchises and franchise employees.231 Vhile the
single-entity argument could aid McDonald's in avoiding antitrust liability,
it would open it up to a finding that it is a joint employer with its franchisee.
A finding that McDonald's is a single entity with its franchisees would
reasonably lead to the conclusion that McDonald's exercises control over its
franchisees, which was a key finding in Williams. This would directly
contradict the position McDonald's has taken in the joint-employer
litigations.
In Salazar, McDonald's completely disavowed any role in the
franchisee's operations. On appeal, it specifically stated that it played no role
in the hiring of franchise workers.232 It further recognized and acknowledged
that it has a McDonald's system that is established and enforced via the
franchise agreement, 233 but it fell just short of labeling it an intrabrand
system. McDonald's assertions in its brief in Salazar wholly failed to
acknowledge, let alone discuss, the existence of the no-hire clause, which at
the time the franchisee signed the agreement in 2010 was in all of
McDonald's franchise agreements. 34
B. Importing IntrabrandAssertionfrom Antitrust into Labor Law Joint
Employer
Franchisors like McDonald's should not be able to assert control over
their franchisees and franchise employees and then disavow it. The
intrabrand franchise-system argument from the antitrust lawsuits, and
whatever other terms used by franchisors to argue that they can lawfully
engage in coordination with their franchisees, should be brought before the
court in the joint-employer cases. More specifically, the no-hire agreements
should be highlighted as a key factor in demonstrating how franchisors
exercise direct control over franchise employees. This direct control, when
coupled with the indirect control exercised or reserved in the franchise
agreement, helps to establish joint-employer liability.
Although the state of the joint-employment standard is in flux, as of
230. Robertson v. Sea Pines Real Estate Cos., Inc., 679 F.3d 278, 285 (4th Cir. 2012)
(quoting Am. Needle, Inc. v. NFL, 560 U.S. 183, 195 (2010)).
231. See e.g., Abbouds', No. CV04-1895P, 2005 WL 2656591.
232. Brief for Defendants-Appellees McDonald's Corp. et al. at 1, 6, 8-10, 13-15, 22-23, and
25, Salazar v. McDonald's Corp., 944 F.3d 1044 (9th Cir. 2019) (No. 17-15673).
233. Id. at 43.
234. Salazar v. McDonald's Corp., No. 14-CV-02096-RS, 2016 WL 4394165, at *1 (N.D.
Cal. Aug. 16, 2016).
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September 2019 the rule pronounced by the Board in Browning-Ferris,and
affirmed on appeal, is the current standard. The Browning-Ferris appeal
court held that besides direct control, indirect control that pertains to the
essential terms and conditions of the workers' employment can be a factor
in determining joint employment. The two most relevant factors in assessing
an employer's indirect control over the franchise employees are "(i) an
employer's authorized but unexercised forms of control, and (ii) an
employer's indirect control over employees' terms and conditions of
employment."23 5
The intrabrand enterprise argument raised by McDonald's supports a
finding of direct control over franchise employees. Through the no-hire
clause in the franchise agreement, franchisors dictate the hiring terms for
franchise employees and control the franchisees' hiring capabilities.
Franchisors could argue that no-hire clauses are part of its efforts to promote
brand uniformity within the franchise, which is the core of the intrabrand
system and single entity argument in antitrust and does not relate to labor
conditions. However, such an argument would be unsupported by the facts.
No-hire provisions "clearly restrict job qualifications for franchisee
'
They do
employees and franchisees' freedom in their hiring decisions."236
not relate to the franchise product or the sale of hamburgers to the consumers
and do not promote competition within the franchise for employees but
rather restrict it. No-hire clauses strictly control a franchisee's ability to hire
employees.
This factor alone may be insufficient to find franchisors liable as joint
employers for the labor violations of its franchisees. McDonald's could
argue that it controls its franchise products (such as prices of the hamburgers,
store layout and location, and recipes) as seen by the consumer, but it does
not control labor conditions because it does not directly employ franchise
workers, or set their wages or their working conditions.237 But when the
evidence of direct control through no-hire clauses is coupled with evidence
from the franchise agreement of indirect control over the franchise
235. Browning-Ferris Indus. of Cal., Inc. v. NLRB, 911 F.3d 1195, 1209 (D.C. Cir. 2019).
236. Kati L. Griffith, An EmpiricalStudy of Fast-FoodFranchisingContracts: Towards A
New "Intermediary" Theory of JointEmployment, 94 WASH. L. REV. 171, 193 (2019).
237. McDonald's can argue that any specific requirements placed on in-store
workers are due solely to the discretion of individual franchisees. But even if McDonald's
does not impose detailed requirements via the confidential Operations & Training Manual that
is incorporated into every franchise agreement, its field inspectors - "Business Consultants"
who conduct three different levels of review and "Mystery Shoppers" who engage in test
transactions - evaluate franchisees at a much higher level of granularity than can be found in
the requirements publicly acknowledged by McDonald's and analyzed by courts.
Deepa Das Acevedo, Invisible Bosses for Invisible Workers, or Why the Sharing Economy Is Actually
Minimally Disruptive,2017 U. CHt. LEGAL F. 35, 50-51 (2017) (citations omitted).

2019]

AN ANTITRUST VIOLATION OR EVIDENCE OF JOINT EMPLOYER

317

employees' terms and conditions of employment, as is currently allowed
under Browning-Ferris,it amounts to a showing of a joint employer.
Franchise agreements incorporate policies and standards to which the
franchisees and, most importantly, franchise employees must strictly adhere.
As explained by Professor Andrew Elmore, franchisors exert control "by
supervising store operations through comprehensive operational standards
that franchisees, their managers, and employees must meet, and by
'
According to Professor
monitoring those standards in franchise stores."238
Elmore, "the franchise relationship is often misunderstood by the judiciary
as an arms-length relationship when, in fact, it is frequently characterized by
ongoing dependence."23' 9 By using the franchise agreement as a cover,
franchisors are able to characterize supervisory control as "operational" or
"quality" control.24 °
For example, a review of McDonald's most recent franchise agreement
shows it not only exerts control over the franchisees through the no-hire
clause, butessentially dictates the franchisees' terms and conditions of
employment. 241 The agreement provides specific standards and policies to
further uniformity in the "McDonald's System.

2 42

It lists comprehensive

guidelines.243

It obligates franchisees to use only McDonald's
operating
advertising and promotional materials and spend at least at least 4 percent of
gross sales on advertisements. 244 It also requires that managers attend
Hamburger University, "the international training center for the McDonald's
system. 245 It further designates the hours of operation for all locations.24 6

Moreover,
like many franchisors, McDonald's often facilitates the
hiring process for franchisees by listing, describing, and
processing employment positions via a centrally-managed

238. Elmore, supra note 7, at 918.
239. Andrew Elmore, The Future of Fast Food Governance, 165 U. PA. L. REV. ONLINE 73,
74 (2017).
240. Id. at 80 (explaining how fast food franchisors are able to defeat joint-employment claims
by characterizing supervisory control as quality control).
(TRADITIONAL),
241. EXHIBIT
B:
FRANCHISE
AGREEMENT
<https://www.scribd.com/doc/233487415/McDonalds-Franchise-Agreement> (last visited Feb. 16,
2020).
242. Id. 12.
243. Id. 12(b) & (c); see also Acevedo, supra note 237, at 52 (explaining how McDonald's
exercises considerable oversight over its franchisees and franchise employees "via its inspections, its
manuals and flyers, and nearly two thousand hours of uncompensated pre-approval training for aspiring
franchisees").
244. EXHIBIT B: FRANCHISE AGREEMENT (TRADITIONAL), supra note 241, 5.
245. Id. 6.
246. Id. 12(g).
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website. Once they are hired, McDonald's software
schedules and occasionally tracks workers in real-time.
[T]hese actions allow
247 McDonald's to invisibly encourage
uniform behaviors.
While these factors seemingly only affect the product market, they are
in fact a cover for the franchisors to create an ongoing dependence and
exercise indirect control over franchise employees' terms and conditions of
employment. These aspects of control and coordination, while arguably
permissible and allowable under antitrust, lend themselves to a
determination of joint-employer status for franchisors.
A recent study by Professor Kati L. Griffith of "forty-four contracts
between the top fifty fast-food franchisors and their franchisees in 2016"
suggests that "some franchisors may exert considerable influence over the
managers at their franchised stores, who in turn influence front-line
'
She suggests that through using contractual restrictions in
workers."248
franchise agreements, franchisee managers are serving as "intermediaries
between franchisors and front-line workers such that, in some cases,
franchisors are joint employers (along with the franchisee) of front-line
workers.- 249 Under her new "intermediary" theory of joint employment,
franchise agreements should be reviewed for their control over the terms and
conditions of franchise employees by using franchise managers as
intermediaries to accomplish such control, whether direct or indirect.2 °
Thus, in determining fast food franchisors' liability as joint-employers,
franchisors' intrabrand argument, which arguably entails a concession that
they exercise control over the franchisee's employment and personnel
matters (mainly hiring) should also be considered. The terms of the franchise
agreement, with the understanding that franchisors desire to engage in
coordination by way of no-hire clauses, should be given special attention.25 1
247. Acevedo, supra note 237, at 50.
248. Griffith, supra note 236, at 173.
249. Id.at 173-74.
250.
Unlike franchisees, franchisees' managers do not have an ownership
interest in the franchise. Nonetheless, franchisees' managers do have
influence over front-line workers at franchised stores. If the franchisor
influences the franchisees' supervisorial managers and those managers
influence the franchisees' front-line employees, it follows that the
franchisor affects the franchisees' front-line employees.
Id.at 186.
251. While the franchisors' assertions in different cases cannot be used against them as a
judicial or conclusive admission to find that it is a joint-employer or that it violated the Sherman Act,
they nonetheless can be admitted as evidentiary admissions. Leon v. FedEx Ground Package Sys., Inc.,
163 F Supp. 3d 1050, 1071 (D.N.M. 2016) (explaining that the Tenth Circuit permitted "the defendant to
introduce the plaintiff's prior inconsistent pleadings, noting that [t]he ancillary complaint is factually

inconsistent with the position plaintiffs pursued in this case and therefore constitutes an admission against
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Doing so will help to establish unanimity as to how to characterize the
252
franchise terms.
C. The Uber Analogy
The franchisors' antitrust-labor law tension is a part of the broader
coordination issue in antitrust law debate currently explored by scholars. The
coordination problem is also prevalent in on-demand, online platforms and
is exemplified by Uber. Fast food franchisors and on-demand platform
employers, like McDonald's and Uber, raise parallel arguments in seeking
to coordinate yet disavow liability - they argue that they are simply
facilitators connecting two independent actors and do not play a role in the
labor conditions for the workers that sell the end product.
As examined by Professor Sanjukta Paul, Uber physically and
economically coordinates the selling of services through its Uber app by
setting prices for the services rendered by its Uber drivers. In doing so, it
benefits from the nonenforcement of price-fixing regulations of antitrust law,
while simultaneously benefiting from the enforcement of price-fixing laws
to prevent Uber drivers from organizing to bargain for better working
conditions." 3 Using an existing antitrust paradigm - namely price-fixing Uber is able to set prices for the services that the drivers provide, which
increases Uber's profits as well as the costs to consumers, while denying the
drivers who provide the services the ability to collectively bargain about
payments.2 54 The result is that different price-fixing standards are applied to
Uber. Uber is implicitly allowed to use different norms when it deals in the
labor market (Uber bargaining with Uber drivers) and in the consumer
market (Uber bargaining with Uber riders). 255 "This is paradoxical, for it
implies that Uber is entitled to derive an economic benefit from a premium
interest pursuant to Fed. R. Evid. 801 (d)(2)" (citation and internal quotations omitted)). But see Martel v.
Stafford, 992 F.2d 1244, 1248 (1st Cir. 1993) ("[U]nlike, say, factual allegations in trial court pleadings,
statements contained in briefs submitted by a party's attorney in one case cannot routinely be used in
another case as evidentiary admissions of the party."). They can be presented to the court, and if the court
so chooses, the franchisor will have an opportunity to address the assertions. See e.g., Leon, 163 F Supp.
3d at 1071; see also In re Applin, 108 B.R. 253, 259 (Bankr. E.D. Cal. 1989) ("Evidentiary admissions,
unlike judicial admissions, are mere evidence, are not conclusive, and may be contradicted by other
evidence.").
252. See Estate of Anderson v. Denny's Inc., 987 F. Supp. 2d 1113, 1155 (D.N.M. 2013)
(explaining that "there is not a consensus among even those few courts on how to characterize similar
facts [and terms in the franchise agreement], as one court may interpret a fact as giving the franchisor
control over daily operations, while another court may interpret that same fact as simply protecting a
trademark").
253. Sanjukta Paul, Uberas For-ProfitHiringHall, 38 BERKELEY J. EMP. & LAB. L. 233,237
(2019).
254. Id. at 238-39.
255. Id.
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from coordination in the price of ride services, at the expense of Uber riders,
while Uber drivers are not entitled to benefit from the premium. '"256
The Uber paradox highlighted by Professor Paul is yet another example
of the existing conflicts in antitrust law. It is similar to the antitrust-labor
tension explored in this article, discussing how franchisors can use different
price-fixing norms in the labor market, controlling the franchise employees'
employment conditions and, in the consumer market, the franchise products
that reach the consumer. The "Uber problem ' 257 is an indication of broader
issues plaguing present-day workers: addressing how labor law can protect
workers, especially the most vulnerable, in a fissured workplace.
VII. CONCLUSION

By exercising control over franchise employees to restrict their
movement, but then disavowing that it is exercising such control, franchisors
like McDonald's are engaging in corporate manipulation and using franchise
agreements as both a sword and a shield. Because they need not address the
admissions they have made to the courts, they are having their cake and
eating it too - to the detriment of low-wage, unskilled workers who are
simply trying to find ways to better their economic conditions. Franchisors
should not be able to assert control over their franchisees and their employees
and then disavow that control. 258 Thus, when courts analyze whether
franchisors are joint employers, franchisors' assertions in antitrust litigation
as to no-hire agreements should be considered because they are evidence of
direct control and support a finding ofjoint-employment liability.

256. Id. at 239.
257. See Sanjukta Paul, Fissuringand the Firm Exemption, 82 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 65,

72 (2019) ("[T]he Uber problem is a more brazen version of the franchising problem, and it creates a
more obvious conflict under existing antitrust law.").
258. It appears that McDonald's and the franchisees recognize the problems with the current

system and are exploring ways to address the challenges posed by the current franchise regime. See Gary
Occhiogrosso, McDonald's Franchisees Meet to Find a Seat at the Table, FORBES (Oct. 15, 2018),
<https://www.forbes.com/sites/garyocchiogrosso/2018/10/15/mcdonalds-franchisees-meet-to-find-a-

seat-at-the-table/#6ffeefle6986> (explaining that the franchisees' "National Owners Meeting" with
McDonald's "indicates that McDonald's franchisees-are considering using their unified voice to have a
more significant say in decisions that affect their bottom line").

